Ensuring quality education for young refugees from Syria
Mapping exercise on quality education for young refugees from Syria (12–25 years)

Research report

Authors
Hashem Ahmadzadeh, Metin Çorabatır, Jalal Al Hussein, Leen Hashem and Sarah Wahby

Supervised by Dawn Chatty

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Refugee Studies Centre
Oxford Department of International Development
University of Oxford
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<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>AFAD</td>
<td>Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency of Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>Accelerated Learning Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLN</td>
<td>Basic Literacy and Numeracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBE</td>
<td>Community-Based Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRDP</td>
<td>Centre for Educational Research and Development (Lebanon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Extra-Curricular Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCS</td>
<td>Former Child Soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FE</td>
<td>Formal Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KRG</td>
<td>Kurdistan Regional Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KRI</td>
<td>Kurdistan Region of Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INEE</td>
<td>International Network for Education in Emergencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMOE</td>
<td>Syrian Interim Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITS</td>
<td>Informal Tented Settlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEHE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education and Higher Education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Executive summary

As the Syrian crisis continues to displace communities on a massive scale, governments and civil society in the region strive to deliver quality education to refugee children and young adults from Syria. Tremendous efforts on the part of education actors have resulted in the expansion and adaptation of national education systems in Jordan, Lebanon, Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and Turkey. At secondary level specifically, demand far outweighs supply, leaving the majority of refugee youth excluded from quality formal and non-formal education. Throughout the Northern Iraq / Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) camps there is currently only one functioning secondary school. In Lebanon secondary level public schools are under-resourced and overcrowded in spite of the double-shift system. In Turkey, post-primary schooling is limited to camp settings, whereas for self-settled refugee youth there are long waiting lists to access public schools. Jordan’s public schooling system is over-burdened and unable to absorb all school-age refugee students threatening the quality of education provision in the country. In all four contexts the language barrier and choice of curriculum present hurdles to learning in the classroom. Certification and accreditation for studies is not guaranteed and this can deter young people from continuing or re-entering formal and non-formal education.

Intertwined social factors can also prevent refugee youth from Syria accessing quality education, many of which are dictated by economic deprivation: young women are marrying early due to social norms that suggest that doing so will protect them from rape and secure their economic future. This custom is excluding girls and young women from continuing their education. Young people, the majority being male, are engaging in paid employment rather than formal and non-formal education. Self-settled refugee communities tend to find housing in affordable areas, removed from central city locations where schools are more widely available. This means students have to travel and incur those costs to continue their education. This deters students for economic and safety reasons. Education interventions targeted at refugee young people need to respond and address these social trends to ensure accessibility, responsiveness and relevance.

More schools, training centres, Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET), psychosocial support and on-the-job training opportunities are urgently required to meet the needs and educational aspirations of young refugees from Syria. The construction of schools and centres is underway, and teacher training and recruitment is in progress, but resources are strained and funding is insufficient. Increased funding combined with innovative thinking and flexible systems are needed to ensure quality education for Syria’s young refugees.
Introduction

The Syrian crisis has uprooted the largest number of refugees in recent history. Half of the refugee population are children and young people forced to flee from home and rebuild their lives not knowing if or when return may be possible. It is clear that the initial emergency relief initiatives for Syria’s refugee crisis must now evolve to develop longer-term strategies. This mapping exercise focuses in on refugee youth education, a crucial yet often overlooked element in Syria’s humanitarian response.

Education is a protective factor for refugee youth. Relevant and responsive formal and non-formal education (NFE)\(^1\) offers stability and purpose, opportunities to rebuild social capital, re-establish a routine and continued development of skills and knowledge for future generations (Ackerman, Jalbout and Petersen 2014; Mercy Corps 2014; Save the Children 2008). The right to education for all children and young people under 18 years in enshrined in a number of international conventions\(^2\) and stipulated in the Millennium Development Goals and Education for All targets, yet notably secondary formal and non-formal education is largely omitted from these global targets (INEE 2010). Indicative of this is allocation of resources: In 2005, the World Bank allocated 43% of its education budget to primary schooling, 12% to tertiary, but only 8% to secondary schooling (Chaffin 2009 in INEE 2010). At the international level, education for adolescents affected by conflict are not prioritised in terms of protection, assistance and learning opportunities (INEE 2010; Interview NGO1, 2014).

This report addresses the educational status of refugees from Syria aged 12-25 years. It determines their needs and maps some of the services provided by various organisations since the beginning of the Syria crisis in 2011, outlining gaps and challenges as well as progress and successful initiatives. In so doing, it is hoped the report may contribute to help key actors, from NGOs to international donors, to improve educational assistance through a better understanding of the needs of refugees.

Assessing the educational status of refugee children from Syria (12-18) and young adults (19-25) is a complex undertaking. For not only does such an age range cover three different streams of formal education: primary, secondary and post-secondary but also refugee education is a multi-faceted process covering various types of services such as non-formal, formal, Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) and psychosocial support. It involves a wide range of services providers, including state institutions, international and local NGOs, and Community Based Organisations (CBOs); and targets refugee children and youth from different social backgrounds, with varying levels of exposure to war, places of residence (inside or outside camps for instance), and nationalities (e.g. Kurdish, Palestinians, Syrians and Turks).

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\(^1\) To distinguish between these types of education, in this report, formal education is defined as the traditional, structured education system consisting of primary school, secondary school and university. It can also refer to full-time technical and professional training courses held within institutions. Non-formal education refers to organised educational activity that takes place outside of the formal education system. (Coomb, Prosser and Ahmed 1973).

This report is the product of a four-month mapping which explores the educational aspirations and needs of refugee youth in Jordan, Lebanon, Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and Turkey. Access to higher education is omitted from this mapping exercise. For a comprehensive overview of tertiary education needs of refugee youth from Syria, please see recent research by the Institute for International Education (IIE) which is now entering its third phase and studies the conditions and educational needs of Syrian university students and scholars in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey (Watenpaugh, Fricke and King, 2014). This paper aims to act as a guide to existing, targeted refugee youth education activities but does not detail all refugee youth education initiatives in the region. Based on the field sample and secondary literature, it evaluates gaps in provision and sets forth ideas for up-scaling good practice. Focussing on the needs and aspirations of this age group is critical to enable young people to fulfil their individual potential and that of their community.

Part one begins with the research objectives and methodology, followed by a literature review to summarise and synthesise existing research findings, mapping exercises and reports on education for refugee children and youth from Syria. Part two presents field research findings from Jordan, Lebanon, Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and Turkey, capturing the perspectives of refugee young people, practitioners and experts on education for refugee youth in camps, rural and urban settings. The final section draws conclusions and presents the overarching themes emerging from the research. This project aims overall to contribute to directing resources and shaping future programming to enhance educational quality for refugees youth that corresponds with their demands and needs.

Objectives
This research is founded on four key objectives:

- **Educational demand**: to identify the educational needs and wishes of young people from Syria and their families in the four neighbouring host countries (Lebanon, Jordan, Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and Turkey), differentiating between the different contexts within those countries (camp, self-settled) as well as the educational types and levels of formal and non-formal education, including TVET;
- **Educational supply**: to identify current practices by local, regional, international and UN organisations in the host countries in both formal and non-formal education, curriculum development, literacy courses, teacher training and hiring practices, as well as TVET opportunities; including some idea of what potential resources might be available within the Syrian refugee community (e.g. existing teachers, skilled young people). A list of the education providers for Syrian refugee youth operating in Lebanon, Jordan, Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and Turkey is available in annex 1 of this report;
- **Gaps**: To identify gaps in provision versus needs, and how they might be addressed referring, where relevant, to particularly useful examples in the provision of quality formal and non-formal secondary education for refugee youth fleeing Syria and living in Lebanon, Jordan, Northern Iraq Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and Turkey;
- **Good practice**: to identify practices which appear to be effective and scalable in the provision of quality formal and non-formal secondary education and TVET for refugee youth fleeing Syria living in Lebanon, Jordan, Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and Turkey.
1 Methodology

This mapping exercise employed a purposive sampling method (non-probability), involving quantitative and qualitative data collection tools. Focus group discussions and semi-structured, qualitative interviews formed the modes of primary data collection. A review of secondary data of previous mapping exercises, field reports, statistics, news articles and multimedia covering the youth education for refugee communities displaced from Syria helped to triangulate field findings.

Research team

The research team comprised ten staff members as well as hired local assistants; their roles are detailed in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 Field Researchers</td>
<td>Based in Jordan, Lebanon, Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and Turkey respectively. Each field researcher arranged and facilitated Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with refugee youth and caregivers. In addition, field researchers carried out semi-structured, qualitative interviews with governmental and non-governmental organisations, community leaders, education actors and UN agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Assistants</td>
<td>Members of the refugee communities, were recruited prior to FGDs. The local assistants assisted the field researcher in networking within communities, inviting attendees and arranging FGDs. Furthermore, these assistants attended and took notes throughout each FGD, allowing the field researcher to facilitate open discussion with refugee youth and caregivers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Field Coordinators</td>
<td>Based in Jordan, Lebanon, Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and Turkey respectively. Each field coordinator assisted the field researchers in networking to arrange interviews and FGDs. Field coordinators analysed primary field data and were the lead authors for their country report, summarising primary data findings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Mapping Coordinator</td>
<td>Supported field staff remotely from the UK. The mapping coordinator prepared a literature review and conducted interviews with experts to supplement secondary data. The mapping coordinator collated the country reports and literature review to produce the final report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Mapping Project Lead</td>
<td>Provided training, support and overall supervision for the research and report writing process.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Mapping research team

Ethical considerations and standards

To commence the mapping exercise, all field researchers and coordinators attended a research and ethics workshop led by Professor Dawn Chatty, in May 2014, in Beirut. The training underlined the required research methods and ethical considerations in line with the University of Oxford’s research ethics standards. Refugees often find themselves in a dependent and unequal relationship with aid providers, researchers and government officials. In response to this, the research team analysed the potential power dynamics and intercultural relations that could arise during interaction between the sometimes foreign researcher, organisations and potential research participants. Language is one such potential barrier that can create unequal relations if translators need to be used. In recognition of this, as well as the significance of language, four bilingual (English/Arabic) field researchers were selected from the region: two from Syria (refugees themselves) and two from Iraq.

For the FGDs, refugees between the ages of 12-25 were invited to take part. Caregivers had to give consent and accompany those between 12-16 years to protect and safeguard the young
people. Oral consent from all participants was obtained prior to conducting the FGDs. Researchers emphasised at the beginning of the process that participation was entirely voluntary, and that non-participation would have no adverse practical consequences for the participants.

A clear explanation about the project was provided to all participants in advance, combined with provision of participant information sheets, in English and Arabic as well as contact details for future reference and any complaints or feedback on the research process. Whenever possible, potential interviewees and FGD participants had one day or more to consider whether to take part and give their informed consent. Cultural context is a critical factor in negotiating informed consent in an ethical fashion in the Arab Middle East. Arab culture has a strong oral tradition where ‘one’s word’ is as good as a written contract. The repressive and authoritarian regimes of the region, particularly the Syrian Ba’athi state have made many Syrians cautious with regard to bureaucracy and officialdom. In previous research in Syria and Lebanon, it was noted that even well-educated people who were informed and willing to participate in research felt uncomfortable in signing official looking paperwork.

For these reasons, verbal consent was the most appropriate method for documenting consent from those interviewed for the mapping exercise. Many are working in high-pressure environments on the politically sensitive issues of conflict and displacement. Some may have concerns related to organisational reputation or individual careers. A written pro-forma in this context seemed cumbersome and off-putting and therefore informed verbal consent was sought instead. With regards to data storage, all interviews were digitally recorded, downloaded to the researcher’s password protected laptop and deleted from the recorder as soon as possible after the interview for confidentiality purposes.

2 Research methods

Focus Group Discussion (FGD)

The research teams conducted FGDs involving a total of 118 refugee youth between the ages of 12 to 25 and 32 caregivers. Of the FGD participants, 51% were female and 49% male. The chart below details the number of male and female youth in addition to caregiver attendance per country.

![Breakdown of Refugee Youth Focus Group Discussion attendees](chart.png)
The research team disaggregated participants by nationality, age, gender and educational status. Young people were initially selected by field researchers via existing networks within the refugee community and civil society. Local hire assistants assisted in identifying participants in the four countries. Snowball sampling was used purposively to draw together a wide range of refugee youth. Each field team incorporated young people living in urban spaces, rural areas and camp settings. Researchers sought to get a sample of young women and men, those in education and those currently out of education as well as young Palestinian, Syrian, Turkish, Kurdish and Iraqi youth displaced by the Syrian conflict. Caregivers accompanied participants younger than 16 for protection and safeguarding purposes. Field researchers facilitated FGDs and sought to elicit demand, supply, gaps and good practice in education provision. A FGD guide using several open-ended questions was developed as a way to keep track of the discussion but allow for an open flow of ideas and responses. Held in or near to refugee communities, discussions were easily accessible for attendees. A local assistant from the refugee community helped to run the FGD and took notes of points raised. Attendees of each FGD received mobile phone credit as a gift as well as refreshments and reimbursement for any transportation costs incurred.

**Jordan**
Three FGDs were organised by the field researcher in association with local CBOs in areas hosting large numbers of refugees: one in Russeifeh (Zarqa governorate), one in Sweileh (Amman governorate) and one in Ramtha (Irbid governorate). The latter actually comprised two consecutive meetings. Three of these FGDs involved male and female participants aged 12-25 and one FGD included 11 younger children aged 12-15 and their parents (in Ramtha). None of the young participants were working and only a mere 5% in Ramtha governorate were in any form of education or training.

**Lebanon**
From June 14 to July 24, 2014, the team conducted four FGDs with a total of 29 Syrian refugee children and youth who had fled Syria in the past three years. Participants were identified by local assistants hired in the four areas; Beirut, Saida, Beqaa, and Tripoli. Beirut is the capital of Lebanon, while Saida is a coastal urban city 30 minutes south of Beirut, and Beqaa is a rural area located at the Lebanese – Syrian border approximately 1.5 hours from Beirut. Tripoli is a densely populated coastal city two hours north of Beirut. The discussions revealed that nearly all participants in Beirut, Beqaa and South FGDs come from financially disadvantaged refugee families living in marginalised urban and rural suburbs, Informal Tented Settlements (ITS) and refugee camps. None of the Beqaa participants were in education, training or employment in contrast to Beirut where 82% of participants were in education (see Table 2). Distinctively, the participants in Tripoli FGD come from lower middle class families living in the city. The discussions were facilitated and documented by the field researcher and local assistant.

**Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)**
From June 18 to July 27, 2014, the team conducted four focus group discussions with a total of 58 participants. The group in Kasnazan had 18 participants – 10 females, four males and four caregivers. In Qushtapa 19 young people attended including 11 females and eight males. The FGD in Sulaymaniyah involved younger children, who were accompanied by two caregivers totalling 11 participants. Finally, the Duhok FGD had 10 participants: one young woman, seven young men and two fathers. The participants of all FGDs were from different parts of Syria, the majority from Kurdish areas of the country. The majority of FGD participants were
working, with the minority accessing any education or training both in camp and urban settings (Table 2).

**Turkey**
Between July 6 and 18, 2014 three FGDs were conducted, each with six-seven participants from two age groups: 12-16 years old and 16-25 years old. For the younger group children were encouraged to participate with their caregivers as per ethical considerations, to ensure child safeguarding and protection. Two girls, three boys and two caregivers participated in the FGD carried out at a Syrian school in Antakya, where all participants were in school. The older group was segregated by sex: six females and seven males participated in the two FGDs that were held in a Syrian coffee shop in Gaziantep as designated by the participants as a comfortable and familiar place. The FGD for young men found 43% were in work, compared with none in the female group where the majority were in education or training (Table 2). A fourth FGD in Kilis was cancelled due to an insufficient number of participants. It was scheduled for the afternoon at the end of Ramadan and as school had closed few could attend.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>No. of Youth Participants</th>
<th>No. of Care-givers</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>% of FGD youth in education</th>
<th>% of FGD youth in employment</th>
<th>Date (2014)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Zarqa, Working Women Society CBO</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12-24</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>Syrian</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>11-Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amman, Education Centre</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13-18</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Syrian</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>17-Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ramtha - Sawaed</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12-14</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Syrian</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>11-Aug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12-16</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Syrian + Palestinian</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>14-Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saida</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14-18</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Syrian</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>30-Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beqaa</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14-26</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Syrian</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3-Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14-20</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>Syrian</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>24-Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)</td>
<td>Kasnazaran (Urban Area) Erbil</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14-25</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Syrian + Kurdish</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>9-Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quatapa Camp Erbil</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12-23</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Syrian + Kurdish</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>18-Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kurdish Syrian refugee council Sulaymani-yah City</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14-24</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Syrian + Kurdish</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>9-Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Domiz Camp – Duhok</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12-25</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Syrian + Kurdish</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>27-Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Coffee shop, Gaziantep</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>18-27</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>Syrian + Kurdish + Turkmen</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6-Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>School, Antakya</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12-15</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Syrian + Arab</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>12-Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>20-</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Syrian</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>18-Jul</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Semi structured interviews

Semi-structured interviews with practitioners and experts were conducted in Jordan, Lebanon, Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and Turkey. Initially, field researchers relied on existing networks and preliminary research to set up interviews with refugee education providers, practitioners and experts. Using the snowball technique, field researchers then arranged further interviews, aiming to conduct between 20-25 interviews within each country. The research teams in the four contexts interviewed a total of 79 practitioners including community leaders, UN agencies, education actors, local NGOs and international NGO practitioners. In the UK, the mapping coordinator conducted five interviews with practitioners and refugee education specialists to explore and supplement ideas emerging from the literature review. See the charts below for a breakdown by country. The interviewee selection criteria were developed according to the following:

- **Type of education provided**: formal education (FE) (public and private schooling), non-formal education (NFE), and TVET
- **Targeted age-group**: Refugees between 12-25 years
- **Type of service provider/stakeholder**: grassroots organisation, local NGO, international NGO, community leaders, and education experts
- **Geographical coverage**: refugee camps, urban and rural refugee settlements, Informal Tented Settlements (ITS) and Palestinian refugee camps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewees</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community leaders</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN agencies</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers and education staff</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local NGOs</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International NGOs</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government officials</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>23</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Semi-Structured field interviews conducted

**Jordan**

The team in Jordan conducted 23 semi-structured interviews with representatives of different services providers, including organisations that are usually side-lined by official coordination bodies such as Islamic charitable organisations. The interviews took place in Amman from June to August 2014 and lasted approximately an hour.

**Lebanon**

Between June 14 and August 11, 2014, the research team conducted semi-structured interviews with 18 stakeholders and service providers working in education for Syrian refugee children across Lebanon. These service providers reach out to an approximate total of 55,000 female and male refugees of the age group 6-24.
Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)
The research team conducted semi-structured interviews with 21 practitioners and experts working in refugee youth education. Thirteen of the interviews were with INGOs and local NGOs, one with a community leader and three interviews took place with Kurdistan Regional Government officials, including the general director of education in Erbil, the focal point for education emergency at the Ministry of Education and the director of the Central Admission Department at the Ministry of Higher Education.

Turkey
A total of 17 interviews were conducted with Syrian teachers, principals, education specialists from international and Turkish NGOs, and UN agencies. Purposive sampling was used to identify interviewees. Organisations that are targeting Syrian refugees between 12-15 years old through formal or non-formal educational interventions were contacted for interviews: eight interviews were conducted in Gaziantep, five in Antakya, and four via Skype; informal interviews with Syrian parents and educators were carried out throughout the research period. In addition to the interviews and focus group discussions by the field researcher, the Ministry of National Education, UNICEF, the Presidency of Turks Abroad and Relative Communities, the Gaziantep and Cukurova Universities were interviewed in Ankara.

Chart 2: Breakdown of semi-structured interviews conducted with practitioners and experts

Challenges and limitations to the research process
Across all teams, researchers had to overcome significant bureaucracy and gatekeeping systems in order to set up interviews. In Lebanon, the team could not obtain an interview with officials from the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) to gather the governmental perspective on the education provision for refugee youth. In Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), the team successfully set up interviews with larger NGOs and UN agencies after passing through a series of checks, thus limiting the number of interviews conducted overall. In Jordan and Turkey, access to refugee camps was restricted, although the teams conducted FGDs with young people who had lived in camps to somewhat circumvent this data gap.

In Jordan, the research team found it difficult to carry out its interviews in due time. Delays were due to the reduced working hours during the month of Ramadan and the subsequent Eid
al-Fitr holiday. Several stakeholders openly expressed their reluctance to participate due to the ‘unmanageable’ number of research projects on refugee camps and their population. For that reason, in Jordan a refugee coordination structure was established in early 2014 to screen research projects ‘on the basis of operational needs and in the best interests of the refugee populations’ (personal communication, UNICEF, 2014). This screening somewhat delayed research proceedings, reducing the number of interviews conducted in the short timeframe.

Conducting research in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) during summer 2014 posed a number of problems. One of the main challenges that faced the team conducting research and collecting data was the extremely tense political atmosphere especially in Erbil after Islamic State IS, formally known as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), swept much of the north-west of Iraq taking the second largest Iraqi city of Mosul and reaching a mere 40 kilometres south west of the capital, Erbil. The armed conflict in June alone produced hundreds of thousands of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), especially Christians from Mosul. With ISIL advancing and taking new territories (especially Christian and Yazidi villages and towns), the number of IDPs in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) reached over 1.5 million. As a result UN agencies, NGOs and government officials focused on addressing the immediate, emergency needs of the IDP communities, and consequently, Syrian refugees and their educational needs were not prioritised by humanitarian actors during this period. To add to these issues, the research took place during hot weather and the month of Ramadan and as a result, some practitioners were unavailable. Regardless of these hurdles, the Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) team met with 58 refugee young people during a total of four FGDs. The researchers established networks to conduct the interviews and found that approximately 40% of the practitioner participants were new to the region and Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). This limited the ability to comment on the long-term issues facing refugee youth from Syria.

The research team in Turkey was not given access to refugee camps and therefore views from camp-based refugee youth are not included in this study. Therefore, FGDs exclusively capture perspectives of self-settled Syrian refugees in Turkey’s urban settings. Amongst the FGD participants, their socio-economic levels varied from lower-middle class to upper-middle class: children aged 12-16 years who all attended schools, and those aged 16-25 who studied at Turkish universities or had studied at university in Syria before their education was disrupted. Therefore, the findings of this study are limited to this specific group of self-settled urban Syrian refugees, coming from a middle class background. These adolescents and youth are among the most privileged of the Syrian refugee population, and therefore the study excludes the most vulnerable populations in Turkey. Further research should examine the most vulnerable Syrians living in camps and those who self-settle in rural settings and hard-to-reach areas where very little assistance is provided, and often no education facilities are available.

3 Literature review

Definitions
The terms ‘refugee youth’ and ‘refugee young people’ are used interchangeably throughout this report to signify a culturally and ethnically heterogeneous group who identify as Palestinian, Syrian, Kurdish, Turkmen and Iraqi forcibly displaced by the Syrian conflict. Young people are broadly defined as those transitioning from childhood to adulthood. Our understanding of youth are constructed along contextually specific social and cultural lines
and are not generalisable. In the Arab world, young people often have considerable responsibilities within their families and communities; with marked capacity to cope with duties, adapt to change and make effective judgments (Chatty, 2007). The right to agency of children and young people is enshrined in UNCRC’s article 12 UNCRC Article 12 (Respect for the views of the child). Every ‘young person has the right to say what they think in all matters affecting them, and to have their views taken seriously’ (UNICEF, 2012 p.1). This mapping exercise is founded on this principle and the perspective that refugee youth are resilient and active agents for social change.

Given that ‘young people’ fall between child and young adult, it is rare to find disaggregated data for this population (Cahill, Beadle, Mitch, Coffey and Crofts, 2010). Adults and children remain the traditional statistical division with the quantifiable youth population lost between these two age groups. Indeed, the number of young people displaced by the Syrian crisis is not clearly defined. The issue of calculating refugee populations is a continual challenge, with unregistered refugees uncounted (Crisp, 1999). Not knowing the exact population of young people presents considerable issues in terms of programme planning and outreach to all children and young people. Regardless, the number of youth displaced by the Syrian conflict continues to rise and correspondingly demand for education and training. Below is a review of UN, NGO reports and news articles reporting on key issues relating to quality education for refugee youth from Syria. Experts provided valuable input on key themes emerging from literature, supplementing the findings detailed below.

Demand for refugee youth education
An overarching theme that emerges across the literature is that refugee youth highly value and desire education whether to continue interrupted schooling, progress to higher education or attain more skills for the labour market (Mercy Corps, 2014; Save the Children, 2013; Shuayb, 2014; UNFPA, UNICEF, UNESCO, Save the Children and UNHCR, 2014). While a high percentage of young people may not currently be in education, the majority aspire to return to formal or non-formal education to pursue their long-term goals (Interview LR01, 2014; Shuayb, 2014).

An increase in available schools, training centres and youth-friendly spaces are in demand across all four countries (AFAD, 2013; MEHE, 2014; Save the Children, 2013; UNICEF, 2013; UNHCR and UNESCO, 2013). Governments, education actors and civil society are calling for urgent funding to respond to this demand for quality education. (AFAD, 2013; Shuayb, 2014; UNICEF, 2014a; Watkins, 2013; World Bank, 2013). Expansion of education infrastructure for refugee youth in camp, rural and urban settings would improve access to formal and non-formal education for these young people.

Accessible schools and training centres located in, or close to, refugee communities are needed. Many families and young people in urban centres currently have to travel far to reach education facilities. Travel increases costs and prohibits access for those with limited income and considerable debt (UNFPA et al., 2014; Walker, 2014). With proximity comes a sense of safety as young people travel less and, if needed, caregivers can arrange chaperones to and from the centres. Focus groups conducted by Mercy Corps with young female refugees in Jordan and Lebanon reveal 29% of young women involved in the study leave home only once or less per week due to feelings of insecurity. As a result, many of these young women do not access educational opportunities at all (Mercy Corps, 2014). Some young men are coping with displacement by withdrawing from social interaction (UNICEF, 2013). The need for local shared and protected spaces where young people can meet, socialise and learn collaboratively...
would likely counteract social and educational exclusion (Mercy Corps, 2014; Save the Children, 2008).

Many refugee youth are prioritising paid work to support the family income. In Lebanon, 45% of refugee young men between 19 and 24 years are working, compared with 8% of women of the same age (UNFPA et al., 2014). In Turkey, 64% of refugee women and 49% of men are looking for work (AFAD, 2013). The issue of young people and children engaging in paid work emerged as a reoccurring theme that prevented access to education. The need to work is compounded by the costs implicated in getting an education (Mercy Corps, 2014; MEHE, 2014; UNICEF, 2013; UNFPA et al., 2014). Alternative learning arrangements such as on-the-job training were called for to teach skills that match those needed in the labour market and ‘control the onset of child labour and other negative social consequences’ (World Bank, 2013, p.4).

Training that responds to labour market demands and equips young people with new and transferable skills can be integral to helping refugee youth access dignified employment (BRIC, 2013; IRC, 2011). 93% of youth in a UNICEF survey in Jordan’s Za’atari camp called for Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET): Young women sought skills in tailoring, computing classes and cooking while their male counterparts requested metal work, carpentry, Arabic literacy, barbering and stone masonry (NRC in UNICEF, 2013; UNHCR, 2014a). Other desired skills were language classes, mobile phone repair and business administration (Mercy Corps, 2014; NRC and UNICEF, 2013; UNHCR, 2013). Out-of-school adolescents are looking for further training to build their business management and entrepreneurial skills (UNHCR, 2013).

Financial literacy and budgeting are essential and should be integrated into all education curricula. Basic budgeting, understanding the difference between a ‘need’ and a ‘want’ and monitoring spending habits can help limited cash stretch further (Interview LR03, 2014). Some humanitarian organisations provide TVET opportunities for youth, yet these interventions remain highly limited in capacity and under-researched (IRC, 2011; UNHCR and UNESCO, 2013; UNHCR, 2013). Youth employment training is addressed in further details in the sections below looking at the gaps in education provision and ideas for good practice.

Women’s Refugee Commission (WRC) research engaged with children and youth with disabilities in Lebanon. 70% of the young people they spoke to had conflict-related disabilities and none of these young people were in education or training (WRC, 2013). In turn, in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), a caregiver described how her daughter with a physical disability ‘dreams of being able to attend school, and it saddens her and me that she is unable to do so’ as there are no inclusive education schools locally for refugee students (NRC and UNICEF, p.24). Community centres, schools and other education facilities need to make efforts to open services to youth with physical and learning disabilities (UNICEF, 2013; WRC, 2013). More specialised services are in high demand to respond to chronic conditions, impairments and injuries sustained by refugee communities.

Refugee students require institutional certification and accreditation for formal and non-formal education to ensure any qualifications attained outside of Syria will be recognised upon return or in other countries (UNHCR and UNESCO, 2013; Mercy Corps, 2014; AFAD, 2013). To clarify, differentiation should be made between the terms, ‘certification’ and ‘accreditation’ which can be conflated. ’Accreditation refers to the provision of official endorsement to an institution or programme by an official authority, usually MOE.
Certification refers to the provision of proof of successful completion of learning by an individual’ (UNHCR and UNESCO, 2013 p.8). In Lebanon young people called for the introduction of the Syrian curriculum to counteract accreditation challenges, while in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) the Syrian curriculum is followed in some camp schools and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is making plans to formally recognise examination results (UNFPA et al., 2014; UNHCR, 2014). In Turkey, the Syrian curriculum is not currently recognised and ‘the Syrian Education Commission and the Turkish Ministry of Education determined that Syrian students from 9th to 12th grade should follow the Libyan curriculum’ (Kirisci, 2014, p.26). Without accreditation and recognition of qualifications prospects for progression into further education or employment can be diminished and students are less likely to enrol.

Young people also seek safe learning environments that are free from corporal punishment and where all religious beliefs are respected, ensuring spiritual and cultural security, paramount if meaningful learning is to take place (UNHCR, 2013; Mercy Corps, 2014).

Finally, young people request more recreational, arts and sports activities. These activities provide opportunities for expansive informal education\(^1\) such as building social skills and promoting health, as well as addressing a range of psychosocial and protection issues facing adolescent refugees (Mercy Corps, 2014; Save the Children, 2013).

**Gaps in refugee youth education provision**

Complex and interlinked factors affect access to quality education for many young refugees from Syria. These issues are divided (below) into physical access issues that prevent young people from entering education; and the reasons refugee youth in education and training can struggle to engage in meaningful, quality learning.

The number of refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, Northern Iraq and Turkey continues to rise. This increasing demand is stretching educational resources. Self-settled refugees living outside camp settings make up the majority of students, with 100% of refugees self-settled in Lebanon, 70% of refugees in Jordan, 70% in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and 60% in Turkey respectively (UNESCO, 2013; Save the Children, 2013; UNESCO, 2013b). For this population, access to local public schooling is highly limited, which can prolong the time spent out of formal education. Transportation costs to reach schools and training centres are high and can prohibit attendance (UNFPA et al., 2014; UNHCR, 2013; IMC, 2014).

To expand the spaces available in schools double shift systems, a teaching session in the morning and a second in the evening have been created. The afternoon’s second shift is largely dedicated to refugee students. This system has come under criticism for reducing learning time, separating refugee and host community students, eliminating expressive arts and sports activities and positioning less experienced teachers to deliver the second shift (UNESCO, 2013). Focus group discussions with urban refugee communities in Jordan revealed that parents perceived the quality of education is lower during the second shift (Care International, 2014). While waiting for a place in school, teenagers can fall behind and become reluctant to return to mainstream schooling, especially if they must enter at grades lower than their peers (UNHCR, 2014).

\(^1\) *Informal education: the truly lifelong process whereby every individual acquires attitudes, values, skills and knowledge from daily experience and the educative influences and resources in his or her environment – from family and neighbours, from work and play, from the market place, the library and the mass media. (Coombs et al. 1973)*
In the Var City area of Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) there are no schools in the vicinity thus excluding all refugee from formal education (Save the Children, 2013). In general, across the four countries, access to education for young people is made available in refugee camps by government and NGO initiatives. It is possible to calculate educational demand in camp settings where refugees are registered and counted, making the logistics of education provision somewhat simpler than in urban and rural settings where more youth are out of school.

With limited financial means and work opportunities, refugee families struggle to make ends meet. In response to the family’s lack of income and rising debt it is well documented that young people increasingly engage in work, in particular young men (BRIC, 2013; UNFPA et al., 2014; Mercy Corps, 2014; Save the Children, 2013; UNFPA et al., 2014; UNHCR, 2014a; UNICEF, 2013). Studies in Jordan found that 50% of refugee children and youth are estimated to be working in the informal sector largely in agriculture, as well as begging and street peddling (UNESCO, 2013). In Lebanon, the same proportion are recorded to be working or looking for work (UNFPA et al., 2014; ILO, 2014; Watkins, 2013). In Jordan and Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) these young people assist family members as child-carers or queue for food coupons, thus missing school (Interview LR01, 2014; Save the Children, 2013). Similarly, in Turkey only 17% of urban refugee children and youth surveyed were in schooling, citing the need to work as the primary reason for being out of education (IMC, 2014). This issue is illustrated in Watkins’ report on access to education in Lebanon where a 14-year-old refugee from Syria, who has been out of school since he was 11, explains: ‘It’s very hard to find a place in school. I would like to learn but now I have to help feed our family and also pay the rent’ (2013, p.14).

The right to work is granted to refugees in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and in Lebanon. In Jordan and Turkey, refugees do not currently have the legal right to work, although in the latter this policy is under review and work permits can be obtained (Interview LR03, 2014; Kirisci 2014). Given the protracted nature of the Syria crisis, governments would do well to evaluate the economic potential of enabling refugees to engage in the formal work sector. A thorough discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper but there is empirical evidence to support the economic value in granting the right to work to refugee communities (see RSC, 2014).

Adolescents work worldwide and such experience can provide positive learning opportunities (Chatty 2007). Furthermore, the right to agency and autonomy for youth to support families and communities ought to have merit (Bhabha, 2014). However, in terms of education and learning, there is a marked lack of opportunity for young people to learn the skills and gain the experience relevant to domestic and global labour market needs (UNHCR and UNESCO, 2014).

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4 In Lebanon, refugee workers on average earn 44% less than minimum wage (UNFPA et al., 2014). In Turkey, families earn approximately 50 Turkish Lira per week living and the average monthly rent is 300 Turkish Lira leaving a deficit. Many depend on community support, and charitable donations to cover living expenses.

5 Lebanon and Syria have a bilateral agreement allowing nationals of both countries freedom of stay, work/employment and practice of economic activity. Syrian nationals have the right to work in Lebanon. They need a work permit, as is the case for other non-citizens; however, they pay only 25 per cent of the standard work-permit fee that is a function of the type of job they are pursuing, and they do not need a work contract or a sponsor’ (UNFPA et al. 2014, p.99). Palestinian nationals from Syria living in Lebanon have the right to work but 20 professions are prohibited (UNRWA 2014a).
Refugee children and youth are working in low-skilled, menial jobs that are poorly paid and have the potential to be exploitative. Little protection is afforded to adolescents who are working, save for informal community protection systems. More work needs to be done to enhance youth training and employment, to improve protection systems and expand accredited on-the-job training. Notably, youth unemployment is a major issue in the MENA region even prior to the Syrian refugee crisis: In 2008, only 40% of young men and 15% of young women were employed (ILO, 2010).

Aside from working, some refugee youth have been recruited to join armed opposition groups such as IS, Free Syrian Army, the Kurdish People Protection Units, Ahrar al-Sham, al-Nusra Front and others (Human Rights Watch, 2014). It is arguable that provision of accessible and appropriate education and training opportunities is an important means to prevent youth drop out and simultaneously promote peace and prevent youth engagement with armed groups (MEHE, 2014; UNICEF, 2014).

Another key barrier to physical education access is a lack of required documentation. Many refugee students, having forcibly fled, do not have the needed certificates to re-enter or progress through a new education system (UNFPA et al., 2014). For example, in Jordan, refugee students require a government-endorsed grade 11 school certificate to sit official grade 12 examinations (UNICEF, 2013). In Lebanon and Turkey, refugee students must provide official identification and certification of past schooling to enter into their appropriate grade and to obtain examination results (UNFPA et al., 2014; UNHCR, 2014b). Obtaining these documents is both costly and complicated (ibid). In practical terms, such systems resulted in an estimated 14,000 Syrian refugee students travelling back to Syria in June 2014, aided by NGOs, to sit their high school graduation examinations at great risk to their personal safety (Ackerman, 2014; UNFPA et al., 2014). For Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS) in Lebanon, access to official examinations is contingent on having regular legal status. Visa application processes in Lebanon are continually changing with increases in fees and changes in criteria (Amnesty, 2014). As a result, some families live with irregular status and cannot register births, deaths and marriages, nor obtain government health care and sit official exams. One father explained the impact this system has on his son’s educational progress:

‘This year my son got the highest grades and was ready to take his exams. Then they told us that no Palestinians can renew their visa. We had sorted out all the other documentation and sent a relative to Syria to certify all the papers he needed. It had cost so much money, but we thought it was worth it.’ (Amnesty, 2014, p.15). In this case, having paid the full fee of 200 USD, his son’s visa was renewed but only for 14 days and upon collection it had already expired. The authorities granted no reimbursement, nor could the young person sit his official examinations, nor progress to the next grade (ibid). The systematic educational exclusion of refugee youth will have long-term, wide-ranging negative consequences on the opportunities afforded to young people and their communities.

For those refugee youth who are in the classroom the interlinked psychosocial issues can have an impact on meaningful learning (UNFPA et al. 2014; UNHCR, 2013). There is considerable variance in the methods of placing young people in formal schooling. They can be assigned to an academic year one to two years different from their previous one and this has an impact on their quality of learning, their motivation to learn and can encourage drop out (Interview LR01, 2014). The stress of being forced to move home, live in a new, unfamiliar setting and learn a new curriculum can have a negative impact on learning (AFAD, 2013; Concern Worldwide and Mavi Kalem, 2013). UNICEF research found that 71% of young men living in Jordan’s Za’atari camp are under stress and cope by withdrawing from communication and
In these circumstances, refugee students struggle to engage in school or training. Sparse funding and resources in camp and public schools means many cannot offer free school meals. Students therefore are hungry during the school day, some suffering from malnutrition which impedes concentration and meaningful learning (LCSI, 2013; UNHCR, 2013).

In the refugee context, the aforementioned daily stressors, labour market tensions and poverty can cause polarisation between refugee and host community groups and subsequent xenophobia and discrimination between groups (ILO, 2014; Reuters, 2014). There are numerous records of discrimination and bullying of refugee youth in schools and learning centres to the extent that students drop out (UNESCO, 2013a; Save the Children, 2013). Xenophobic attacks are emerging in Turkey as the rise in the urban refugee population causes social tensions where previously refugee communities were welcomed (Reuters, 2014).

Jordanian public schools located outside refugee camps host small numbers of refugee students increasing the potential for isolation and bullying (UNICEF, 2013). Students report that travelling to and from school result in abuse and harassment in Lebanon. However, a recent UNFPA survey revealed bullying in school was minimally reported (Watkins, 2013; UNHCR, 2014; UNFPA et al., 2014). Research conducted in refugee schools in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) found that an ‘absence of psychosocial support mechanisms have meant that schools both in urban and camps have witnessed an increase in corporal punishment which has increased dropout rates’ (UNHCR, 2014, p.12). Journeying to and from school can create additional barriers to learning: Sexual violence towards women in Jordanian refugee camps inhibits female teachers and young women from reaching education facilities (UNICEF, 2013). These reports contradict the much hoped for safe spaces that ensure protection and offer an environment conducive to learning (Mercy Corps 2014; UNESCO and UNHCR, 2013; UNHCR, 2014; UNICEF, 2013).

From the teachers’ perspective, many work long hours, often teaching double shifts and subsequently require ongoing training and supervision to maintain quality standards. Schools are predominantly overcrowded, placing considerable strain on staff. The arrival of refugee students created classrooms with greater diversity and far more complex psychosocial issues; demanding careful lesson planning, strong classroom management skills and positive discipline strategies (MEHE, 2014; UNHCR, 2013). These combine to create new considerations for teacher training to ensure the needs of all learners are addressed (UNESCO, 2013a). In addition, many teachers work as volunteers or are paid low salaries and have to seek alternative work to supplement their income (UNICEF, 2013; UNHCR, 2014b). This in turn jeopardises teaching quality, with limited capacity for teachers to dedicate time to lesson planning and in-service training. Without adequate salaries, support and training educational staff will struggle to deliver high quality education and respond to the complex issues presented in the classroom (UNHCR and UNESCO, 2014; UNHCR, 2014a).

Past educational experiences in Syria can also create a range of issues relating to education access. It is believed that a fifth of schools in Syria are now destroyed, with ongoing reports of students being attacked or even dying in school, or on their way to school (Human Rights Watch, 2013). It is highly probable a substantial proportion of refugee youth experienced violence and conflict in educational settings. Such emotional history carries significance when re-accessing education in the host community, with some students experiencing fear and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms (UNICEF, 2013; Kirisci, 2014). One noted protective coping mechanism within Syrian society is to marry girls and young women earlier than was customary in Syria (Anderson 2014; UNFPA et al., 2014). It is believed doing so will
protect them from the risk of rape and provide economic security (ibid). In Turkey, 70% of youth over 15 years of age are married (AFAD, 2013). Similarly, in Lebanon, 64% of young women between 19 and 24 years were married in 2013, compared with 43% of young women living in Syria in 2001 (UNFPA et al., 2014). Once married, many girls and young women drop out of education and learning (Anderson, 2014; MEHE, 2014).

In light of the wide-ranging issues refugee youth from Syria must face, it is unsurprising to discover many students report that the content of formal education lacks relevance to their lives (Watkins, 2013; Shuayb 2014). At the basic access level, the language of instruction is often different from their mother tongue, which prevents active engagement in the classroom. Furthermore, young people must adjust to a new social environment, unfamiliar accents and dialects, a new curriculum, and different standards of academic assessment (NRC and UNICEF, 2013). These issues combine to hamper and even stop learning. UNESCO reports that ‘it is rare to witness Syrian refugee children enrolled in the schools in Lebanon make it through to grade 9 or grade 12 and sit for the national exams marking the end of basic or secondary education, leaving almost all Syrian refugee children without a recognised qualification’ (2013a, p.3). In Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) young people believed they had no prospects to study and yearned to return home to study (NRC and UNICEF, 2013). ‘Language of instruction and actual content of the curriculum to be followed are extremely difficult issues to solve politically... The resolution of these challenges is also closely tied to what happens to Syrian refugees in the long run’ (2014, p.27).

Educational actors need to react to vastly different education levels, language needs and psychosocial issues both within and outside the classroom; unfortunately substantial financial and human resource constraints limit the capacity for much needed reflective practice and adjustments. In sum, the reviewed literature reveals an array of intertwined factors that block refugee youth from accessing quality education, many of which are dictated by economic deprivation. The following section highlights some policies and innovative practices drawn from secondary literature that could be scaled-up to enhance the quality education provision for refugee youth from Syria. Further detailed insight into good practice in refugee youth education is provided in part two within the country report sections.

**Good practice in refugee youth education provision**

The Syrian conflict has created a protracted refugee situation on a massive scale. Host communities face the tremendous task of absorbing a vastly increased school-age and young adult population into their national education and training systems. Below are some examples of policy and practice that move towards addressing the aforementioned gaps and barriers for refugee youth education.

As part of the Regional Response Plan for Syria 6 (RRP6), more schools will be renovated and constructed (MEHE, 2014; UNHCR, 2014b). While construction of secondary schools is underway in refugee camps, urban and rural refugee youth remain largely deprived of post-primary education (Kurdistan Region of Iraq Government, 2014; International Crisis Group, 2014). Governments and the humanitarian community in the region must allocate increased resources to self-settled youth education programming. Furthermore, at the macro level, civil society and UN agencies need to advocate for ‘more permissive policy vis-à-vis certification to allow youth entry into formal education’ (UNFPA et al., 2014, p.35). In line with educational demands, government authorities should revise systems to promote educational inclusion and formal accreditation for refugee youth.
Increased numbers of teachers and expanded teacher training opportunities are critical (UNHCR, 2014b). UNESCO in Turkey and Jordan is making important efforts to train education providers, while in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) education authorities train Syrian teachers to work in camp schools (UNFPA et al., 2014; UNESCO, 2013c). Lebanon’s MEHE, the NGO IQRA and UNESCO are collectively training Lebanese and Syrian teachers on learner-centred approaches and INEE’s minimum standards for education in emergencies (MEHE, 2014). Refugee teachers often speak learners’ mother tongue, a key requisite for quality education, and are often aware of students’ former curriculum thus helping in the transition. However, depending on the legal context within the host country, many Syrian teachers are not legally permitted to work in their profession (INEE, 2009).

Training refugee teachers provides much needed employment opportunities and can enhance teaching and learning quality in refugee schools (Watkins 2013; UNHCR and UNESCO, 2013). To supplement teaching and elevate quality of learning, increased individual learning support and mentoring systems for disadvantaged refugee youth would be advantageous. Targeted support for young people such as homework clubs or befriending schemes could supplement remedial classes, enabling youth to set personal goals and plan for future education or employment (NRC and UNICEF, 2013).

Access to education is a key issue, with the need for more coordinated, accessible information and equal distribution of refugee education services. Owing to the wide variety of formal and non-formal refugee education initiatives available, duplication of work can occur as in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) where there are a number of education services for refugee youth in camps but very few in urban and rural settings (UNHCR, 2014). In Jordan, it was reported that some refugee families in Jordan misinterpreted non-formal education programmes as formal schooling and were frustrated to find out no accreditation is offered (Interview LR05, 2014).

Active engagement and community outreach helps to explain systems and access (UNFPA et al., 2014). In Jordan, the MOE is leading a ‘back to school’ nationwide campaign for refugee children and youth. The campaign coordinates peer educators and volunteers to visit refugees in their homes to explain the education system (Jordan News Agency 2014). A caregiver group consulted by NRC in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) proposed training a cohort of community members to provide clear information and orient families on the education system (NRC and UNICEF, 2013). While civil society and governmental actors aspire to adopt participatory approaches, more can be done to fund community and youth involvement strategies. Too often, community leaders are absent from key meetings, conferences and workshops (UNHCR and UNESCO, 2013).

For young people out of school, Youth Friendly Spaces (YFS) can address social isolation, offering an opportunity to gather and learn life skills. These spaces can also facilitate entry to formal schooling or employment. In Turkey, AFAD equipped all refugee camps with recreational facilities including television rooms (Kirisci, 2014). Norwegian Refugee Council’s (NRC) and Save the Children’s youth projects in Jordanian camps that run sport, art, handicrafts, gardening and capoeira courses (Ayasrah, 2014; NRC, 2014). Opportunities to learn taekwondo and participate in drama productions in Jordanian refugee camps demonstrate innovation in refugee youth programming that could be replicated in other settings (Vingiano, 2014; Jaboori, 2014).
Expressive physical and artistic activities are proven to significantly help people in processing their experience of war, migration and loss, and can be invaluable to promote resilience and strengthen coping mechanisms (INEE, 2010; Save the Children, 2013). Inversely, parents in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) reported YFS as ineffective due to few facilitators, lower levels of learning and limited social interaction (Save the Children, 2013). To be effective, YFS must be sufficiently resourced and deliver quality services geared towards progression into work or further education.

Education that allows young people to leave home and learn collectively is preferable. Learning is an inherently social process, yet self-learning is important for those young people in employment or living far from education providers. (Interview LR05, 2014). Construction of community learning centres equipped with reference materials and computers, increased numbers of mobile libraries and national educational television broadcasts are examples of ways refugee youth in rural and urban areas could learn independently (Interview LR01, 2014). However, infrastructure, running costs, electricity and broadcast receivers will need to be assured, a challenge in rural and some urban areas. Expansion of such systems can include youth denied an education as well as supplementing learning for those young people in education or training.

We have seen that poverty and unemployment cause significant financial barriers to education. Cash assistance systems can partially address economic limitations, giving families money to cover school fees, supplies, uniforms, school meals and transportation (Mercy Corps, 2014; NRC and UNICEF, 2013). UNICEF and Lebanon’s MEHE run such schemes to enable access to formal and non-formal education programmes (MEHE, 2014; UNESCO, 2013). Arguably, these initiatives are unsustainable with respect to a protracted and growing refugee situation where funds made available for the initial emergency tend to peter out.

Cash systems also create dependency, diminishing self-reliance and economic resilience among refugee communities. They also fail to demonstrate the economic contribution refugees can make to a host community, in terms of skills, knowledge, workforce and spending power (Interview LR04, 2014). However, until viable livelihoods systems can be established for refugee communities, cash assistance is important for the inclusion of refugee youth in education. In the long-term, Syria’s refugee communities need sustainable livelihoods to secure self-reliance, safety and well-being. In light of this reality, targeted refugee youth initiatives have emerged that help out of school young people to learn new skills and better prepare for employment.

One example is the International Rescue Committee’s employment centre in Lebanon that teaches life skills, literacy, language courses and business skills development. The program also provides cash assistance and job-matching to adults. IRC would initiate similar services in Turkey if the policy environment was conducive to such programming (Interview NGO2, 2014).

IT skills development is another potential area for expansion. UNICEF’s Innovation team tapped into increased online activity among young people globally and piloted the Raspberry PI computer (Nuttall, 2014). The Raspberry PI device costs USD 100, is sturdy and can be dismantled to teach hardware computing skills. It was recently piloted in a Lebanese secondary school with a 30% take up from young women. At a small scale, currently targeting 300 young people at secondary level education, this initiative has potential to be expanded regionally to increase learning opportunities in the IT sector. The vision is to construct community-based computer hubs where youth can learn collectively. While not a replacement
for formal education, IT skills place young people in a position to gain higher skilled employment prospects.

Other mapping exercises and surveys identified a series of craft professions prioritised by refugee youth, namely telecommunications, hairstyling, carpentry, painting, steelwork, electrical repair, masonry and mobile phone repair (Mercy Corps 2014; UNICEF 2013; UNFPA et al. 2014). Training and employment can improve young people’s self-esteem, encourage social integration, resilience and healthy life choices. If done well, young people can also learn skills such as self-regulation and executive functioning, crucial for communities affected by conflict (Interview NGO1, 2014). Research indicates that women significantly benefit from TVET through increased employment and learning opportunities (IRC 2011).

Apprenticeships⁶ are an efficient way to train young people as they address both the usual problem of the curricula relevance (in apprenticeships, the curricula is designed with the employer), and the information failure that can affect recruitment processes (the employer has the opportunity to test the apprentice’s performance) (Interview LR02, 2014). Informal apprenticeships are the most common training format in informal economies, but they include a number of shortcomings (ILO, 2014). ‘Informal apprenticeship refers to the system by which a young learner (the apprentice) acquires the skills for a trade or craft in a micro or small enterprise learning and working side by side with an experienced craftsperson. Apprentice and master craftsperson conclude a training agreement that is embedded in local norms and traditions of a society’ (ILO 2012, p.X).

There are shortcomings and these may include (a) lack of specific curricula and TVET centre based complementary learning, (b) poor occupational safety and health, (c) quasi-exploitative status of the apprentice and (d) lack of certification of the training to validate the learning. These aspects can be addressed through initiatives targeting the upgrading of informal apprenticeships (ILO, 2012), running parallel to improvements for the productivity of informal workshops and businesses. These schemes are a cost-effective means to build social capital, gain new skills and improve employment opportunities (ILO, 2004).

Formal apprenticeships, whilst certified, have a propensity to be more resource-demanding and require established and well-functioning social dialogue mechanisms. The host government needs to allow the right to work for refugees and agree on a certification process from a designated educational authority (on par with other TVET programmes). International labour standards (ILO conventions and recommendations) consistently uphold the principle that apprentices are workers. International good practices show that formal apprenticeships should be at least one year, with a sequencing of on the job and centre-based training sessions adapted to the specific context. Stipends may be required to ensure poorer apprentices can cover transportation, food and other living costs such as childcare if needed (ibid.).

The involvement of the private sector is critical for curriculum relevance, complementarity of the two learning modes and agreement on testing methodologies. Collaboration with employers is also important to ensure that the transition from apprenticeship to a job happens

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⁶ Apprenticeship is a unique form of vocational education, combining on-the-job learning and school-based training, for specifically defined competencies and work process. It is regulated by law and based on an oral or written employment contract with a compensatory payment and has a standard social protection scheme. A formal assessment and a recognised certification come at the end of a clearly identified duration (ILO 2013a, p.11).
in a smooth way. Findings suggest that government-run, subsidised workplace-based learning, without meaningful private sector buy-in, tends to teach skills less relevant to the job market (Interview LR03, 2014).

Government subsidies or economic incentives can expand structured apprenticeship schemes, or as in the case of the German apprentice model, companies are fined if they do not create apprenticeship spaces (ILO, 2010; IRC, 2011). Sponsorship systems place the onus on the private sector to cover further training and education for apprentices (Interview LR01, 2014). Appropriately designed apprenticeship schemes have wide-ranging potential socio-economic benefits for both host and refugee communities in the Middle East, namely promoting social integration, cohesion and addressing youth unemployment. However, they need to rely on a strengthened collaboration infrastructure between government, employer organisations and trade unions. In this regard, it is also important to advocate for greater space for social dialogue, and raise the capacity of social partners to get involved in skills development.

Evidence suggests that youth in urban areas benefit more from such schemes than their rural counterparts (IRC, 2011). Given that the majority of youth displaced by the Syrian conflict are in urban spaces, apprenticeships correspond to the high demand for education and employment from refugee youth (UNFPA et al., 2014). The Turkish government provides incentives to institutions and employers to support apprenticeship schemes (ILO, 2010). No such apprenticeship systems currently exist in Jordan or Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). In Lebanon, 28 public and private schools now offer initial cooperative vocational training in eight occupations, based on the dual system. In the 2010/2011 school year, approx. 1,680 young people underwent training and more than 650 companies offered apprenticeship positions. There is also a special ‘apprenticeship’ pathway institutionalised by decree (Interview LR02, 2014).

Overall, formal apprenticeship opportunities for young people are few in the Middle East, and limited to lower level skills, therefore considerable expansion is needed to involve refugee youth from Syria. Furthermore, while research promotes work-related skills training for refugee youth, there is a notable lack of empirical evidence on the net impact of apprenticeship systems and TVET for refugee youth in the Middle East. Further research and strengthened evaluation systems of existing programmes are urgently needed to expand knowledge and understanding in this area (IRC, 2011; NRC and UNICEF, 2013).

Further research and strengthened evaluation systems of existing programming are urgently needed to expand knowledge and understanding in this area (IRC 2011; NRC and UNICEF 2013). Advocacy with host governments to enable the right to work for refugee communities is the key to successful TVET and apprenticeship schemes. Innovation, leadership and remarkable resilience are common characteristics among displaced young people (Interview NGO1, 2014). Host communities should tap into these strengths and resources rather than risking the loss of tremendous potential:

There is no doubt that what young people strive for is the chance of a decent and productive job from which to build a better future. Take away that hope and you are left with a disillusioned

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7The government of Turkey offers employers a ‘permanent reduction in employer social contributions for the first five years of employment for new recruitment of unemployed women and youth (aged 18-29 years)’ in apprenticeship schemes (ILO 2010, p.79).
Part two moves on to outline the aspirations and realities of refugee youth themselves in relation to education, training and employment prospects. These findings, drawn from primary data gathered in the field from June to August 2014, are interwoven with the perspectives of civil society actors working in refugee youth education.

4 Country reports

Jordan
As a host state, Jordan has been instrumental in shaping the international humanitarian response to the Syrian refugee crisis. Its leverage has covered the screening and monitoring of any proposed project or programme and, for interventions outside the camps, it has requested that they also benefit local host communities, generally according to a ratio of 60% (for Syrian refugees) to 40% (for Jordanians). More importantly, Jordan has defined the refugees’ legal status, thus defining the modalities of their access to its educational system and to the job market.

The report first analyses the general context in which humanitarian assistance operates in Jordan: the demographics of the refugees’ inflow and the legal framework required to assist them. The report then assesses core educational demands for refugee youth and the way international and local stakeholders have responded. The gaps and good practice in refugee youth education provision are reviewed. In conclusion, the report sketches the future contours of the international humanitarian response and provides recommendations related to assistance schemes.

In early August 2014, Jordan was hosting 609,376 Syrians registered with UNHCR, hailing mostly from Deraa (47%), rural and urban Damascus (20%) and Homs (17%). This represents about 10% of the Jordanian population estimated at over 6.4 million. Over half of the refugees (52.4%) are under 18, 44.2% range between 18 and 59 (14.5% aged 18-25) and 3.4% were above 60 years of age (UNHCR, 2014b; Interview JINT20, 2014).

During the 2013-2014 academic year, the number of students enrolled in formal primary and secondary schools, reached 120,555: 20,174 inside camps and 100,381 outside camps. The refugee student population represents about 10.2% of Jordan’s total student population (MOPIC, 2014; UNICEF, 2014; MOE, 2014). Approximately 5% of refugee youth attend formal secondary schooling, compared with about 16% of Jordanian students (MOE, 2012).

Almost half of the registered Syrian refugees (49%) live in two northern governorates bordering Syria: Irbid (23%) and Mafraq (26%) where they represent about two thirds of the total population. The main host governorate remains Amman where Amman city, the

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8Such a request had already been imposed on services providers within the context of the Iraqi refugee crisis (2006-2010). The “screening and monitoring” institution is the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC). International organisations then cooperate with the Ministry of Education (MOE), the Youth Higher Council, and/or with the Ministry of Social Development (informal education).

9According to Jordan’s Department of Statistics, the population of Jordan was it 6.38 million in 2012 (DOS, 2012).
country’s capital and main economic centre has attracted 28% of Jordan’s refugee population. The remaining 23% reside in Jordan’s nine other governorates, ranging from a high of 11% in the Zarqa governorate to 1% and less in the southern governorates of Maan, Aqaba and Tafilah (UNHCR, 2014f).

The refugees’ main geographical marker is defined in terms of residence inside or outside the official camps that were established to better serve refugee communities. Two of these camps are managed by UNHCR and the Jordanian authorities: Zaatari camp in Ma’afraq, established in July 2012, and Azraq camp established in May 2014. A third camp, Zarqa, was established by the United Arab Emirates in April 2013 (UNHCR, 2014f). Although these aforementioned camps currently host approximately 100,000 refugees, comprising less than twenty percent of Jordan’s registered refugees (81,000 refugees; 11,200 refugees; and 5,000 refugees respectively), they have captured the world’s attention as the most vivid symbols of the refugee predicament in Jordan. Refugee camps offer specific services targeted at refugee communities. In the field of education for instance, UNICEF and its main partner, Save the Children, have played a predominant role in establishing and maintaining school facilities in camps. For self-settled refugees living outside camps, the municipalities are in charge of educational provision.

Two other refugee groups from Syria have not been directly registered by UNHCR, which may have resulted in unmet needs. The first group are Palestinian refugees from Syria (approximately 14,000), who crossed from Syria into Jordan in 2011 and 2012 when the border was relatively open (or later with forged Syrian documents), and who were re-registered with UNRWA in Jordan (UNRWA, 2014b). From late 2012 to early 2013, out of fear of another wave of displacement, Palestinian refugees have been barred from entering Jordan, together with other groups such as asylum claimants with or without forged identification documents; single men of military age or with no family ties in Jordan; Iraqi refugees; and any person suspected of attempting to carry out illicit activities in Jordan. ‘Uncertain’ cases are held in transit centres near the border (Cyber City and King Abdullah City) (AlMonitor, 2013; Jordan Times, 2014). Yet, Palestinian refugee families may be accepted on purely humanitarian grounds. The second group are Syrian refugees who crossed the Jordanian border illegally; however, as explained during an FGD, the vast majority of such refugees have managed to register with UNHCR at a later date and, subsequently, with the Jordanian authorities (FGD JFG03, 2014). A third group are Syrian refugees who were welcomed by relatives residing in Jordan before 2011 (these accounted for some 37,000 people in 2004), and who were able to establish themselves without any assistance (MPC, June 2013). 10

Although Jordan has not signed the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, its attitude towards displaced persons/refugees has been tolerant, providing asylum and protection space for numerous groups of refugees mainly from Palestine, Iraq and Syria. In 1998, its Ministry of Interior concluded a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with UNHCR granting it responsibility for processing asylum claims and status determination.

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10 In 2012, the Jordanian government reported that over 100,000 Syrians had crossed into Jordan, whereas only 33,400 were currently registered with UNHCR (Davis, 2012). In April 2013, as the Syrian refugee inflow was reaching its acme, the difference between the UNHCR figures (424,771 –April 2013) and that of the Jordanian government (470,000 – March 2013) had decreased at 45,229 (MPC, June 2013). According to the UNHCR, there is currently no backlog of Syrians awaiting registration (UNHCR 2014b).
The Jordanian authorities’ internal management of refugees from Syria must be assessed in light of the adverse consequences their massive arrival has had on the country’s economy, services, infrastructure and political balance. Jordan has nevertheless allowed the establishment of camps despite its concerns that they might become, similarly to the Palestinian refugee camps, the hubs of a separate political identity. It has also granted Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR (and the Minister of Interior for those living outside camps) free access to public health, and primary and secondary education despite the derailing impact this has on the education reform it launched in 2003 under the name of the Knowledge Economy Program (ErfKE).

More restrictively, Jordan has prevented registered Syrian refugees, many of whom were farmers and unqualified workers, from integrating into the formal job market and TVET training programmes. Jordan’s National Employment Strategy (2010-2020) may have driven this protectionist policy. This strategy aimed, inter alia, to increase Jordanians’ participation in the labour market and reduce the unemployment rate, currently at 12-13%. It took strides to replace foreign workers with Jordanian nationals. In the past large groups of refugees entering Jordan had not been considered as such an economic threat: Palestinian refugees had, on the contrary, been granted citizenship in order to better contribute to the country’s development; and although most Iraqi refugees were not welcomed into the labour market, the fact that they had, on average, a higher educational profile than Jordanians made them appear as an economic asset.

However, Jordan’s current policy regarding employment and technical education for Syrian refugees has shied away from addressing the reality that children and young adults are likely to remain in prolonged exile in Jordan. It must be borne in mind that the Government of Jordan remains the unique stakeholder for such issues: The UNHCR’s protection mandate does not directly cover issues related to regular residency, formal employment or access to public services.

### Demand for refugee youth education provision

Until 2013, it was believed that the downfall of the Syrian Ba’athist regime was close and that, pending return to Syria, free access to schools would mitigate any crisis in education. As a result, humanitarian efforts did not prioritise education provision. The deterioration of Syria into civil war and the dramatic influx of refugees in the first half of 2013 prompted service providers to expand and better coordinate their educational interventions. Effectively, it became understood that the refugee communities were here to stay (Interview JINT2, 2014).

The most pressing objective was to increase the number of refugees enrolled in schools, be they located in camps or in host communities. Free access to public schools had not solved the quantitative dimension of children’s education. In March 2013, at the height of the influx, only 40% of children and youth eligible for formal education had been enrolled, as opposed to former enrolment rates in Syria that reportedly reached almost 100% for both sexes (UNICEF, 2013). During FGDs and interviews in Jordan, young people and practitioners expressed a

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11 Unregistered refugees are not eligible for international assistance that also includes free access to the public health, food vouchers and cash assistance.

12 The ErfKE aims to adapt the entire education system to produce graduates with the skills needed for the knowledge-based economy, and to improve the quality of teaching and of the physical learning environment (Obeidat, U. and Al Masri, R., 2010; MOPIC, 2014).

13 Nearly half of them (46% of men and 42% of women) had completed their education at bachelor or higher level compared with about 10% of Jordanians (FAFO, 2007).
lack of interest in schooling; a longing to return to Syria; psychosocial-related issues; delays in registration with UNHCR and the Jordanian authorities; lack of space in overcrowded schools (over 19,000 of them on waiting lists in September 2013 (UNICEF, 2013); late arrival in Jordan during the school year; ineligibility due to months/years of schooling missed out and/or disapproval of lower grade placement; cost of transportation and safety-related issues; the need to work for boys and the perceived advantage of early marriage for girls; the need for remedial/catch-up classes; and, for refugees in remote locations, a lack of information about available education facilities (UNICEF, 2013).

A (yet unpublished) study conducted by Reach from 2013 amongst urban refugees indicates that age, gender and the head of the household’s educational attainment also influence enrolment and attendance rates. As regards the impact of gender on educational access, enrolment rates among school age refugee children and youth are higher amongst females (74%) than males (71%). Yet, up to 17% of eligible females aged 12-17 said they had dropped out of school because of (early) marriage. Several girls in the same age range participating in focus group discussions admitted that their father had refused to enrol them because of an alleged lack of safety in the neighbourhood (FGD, JFG01, 2014). Attendance is at its lowest amongst males aged 12-17: 44% versus 67% amongst eligible children aged 6-11 and 60% amongst eligible children in general (6-17 years). Nearly one-quarter of eligible males aged 12-17 reported being in employment as opposed to less than 1% of eligible males aged 6-11.

An equally pressing objective was to cater for the educational needs of refugees aspiring to pursue their formal education but who were found ineligible, either because they had missed three years or more of schooling (an ineligibility factor) or because of their specific situation: children with medical conditions, married girls, etc. Enabling them to join formal education in the medium-long term (up to the tawjihi14) outside formal schools (the non-formal education stream) is a task endorsed by Questscope in association with the MOE. Only recently have the needs of refugee youth aged between 16-25 years been addressed. Caught between unaffordable university fees and inaccessible vocational training or formal employment activities, this group tends to be considered a potential threat to Jordan’s stability.

In parallel to formal and non-formal education, informal education is provided to refugees of all ages to address social exclusion and wide-ranging psychosocial issues. Consisting of a variety of activities unrelated to formal schooling (and thus not certified by the MOE) from recreational activities to technical training and life skills, these interventions have taken a prominent role in NGO programming in Jordan since 2012.

Supply of refugee youth education provision

The international response (vis-à-vis education) to the Syrian refugee crisis has involved numerous local, national and international organisations. Several of these organisations availed themselves of years of experience in Jordan, be it on behalf of underprivileged Jordanians or of other refugee groups: UNRWA (1949), UNICEF (1964), Save the Children (STC) Jordan (1974), Questscope (1989), Relief International (2004), or the Jesuit Refugee Services (2008). The Education Sector Working Group (ECWG) that coordinates the interventions of ‘all appropriate organisations and institutions’ was originally established in 2008 to support the coordination of education interventions in favour of Iraqi refugees

14 Tawjihi is the General Secondary Education Certificate Examination in Jordan.
It is chaired by UNICEF and Save the Children International in collaboration with the Jordanian Ministry of Education and continues to coordinate education provision for refugees from Syria.

Education assistance programming has succeeded in raising the number of enrolled refugees in primary and secondary schools. As emphasised by a mother of four, ‘we have experienced many challenges since our arrival in Jordan but the fact that my children were against all odds able to go to school is a constant source of solace’ (FGD, JFG03, 2014). The proportion of enrolled refugee children and youth within the eligible refugee population jumped from 32% in March 2013 to 64% in September 2013 and to 79% in February 2014 (UNICEF 2013; UNICEF 2014). Several types of interventions have contributed to this by enhancing access to education.

First, ongoing awareness campaigns launched by several organisations, most notably STC-Jordan, reached thousands of refugee households (Jordan News Agency, 2014). Other communication links with the refugee communities such as the multi-purpose UNHCR help desks and hotlines may have encouraged school enrolment (Interview JINT16, 2014). Secondly, the expansion of existing facilities with three new schools built in refugee camps and pre-fabricated classrooms installed in 28 public schools outside the camps, all of which brought the number of children on waiting lists down from 19,000 to 8,000 between September 2013 and March 2014 (MOPIC, 2014). Thirdly, in 2013, the large-scale remedial/catch-up programme launched by UNICEF, the Ministry of Education (MOE) and the 20 Madrasati Initiative centres (created in 2008) assisted some 4,400 Syrian (and Jordanian) children aged 6-17 to continue or re-enter formal schooling. Such progress should be qualified, however, as enrolment figures remain low when set against the full school-aged population that also includes non-eligible children (about one-third of that population). In February 2014, those on waiting lists for formal education stood at 55% as indicated in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camps</th>
<th>School-aged Refugees (6-17)</th>
<th>Eligible Refugees (6-17)</th>
<th>Refugees enrolled in UNICEF schools</th>
<th>Enrolled but not in schooling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35,068</td>
<td>24,353</td>
<td>20,174 (A: 58%; B: 83%)</td>
<td>4,179 (C: 20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M: 17,183/F: 17,885</td>
<td>M: 11,933/F: 17,885</td>
<td>M: 9,855/F: 10,289</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Host Communities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>School-aged Refugees (6-17)</td>
<td>Eligible Refugees (6-17)</td>
<td>Refugees enrolled in public schools</td>
<td>Enrolled but not in schooling</td>
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<td></td>
<td>35,068</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As seen in the Interviews list of this report, several NGOs are not part of the Education Working Group, members are denoted by *.

Some private schools, in particular those affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood in the North of the country have registered Syrian refugees for free; remedial classes have also been offered (Interview JINT5, 2014).
Table 4: Analysis key indicators Jordanian school year 2013-2014

Gaps in refugee youth education provision

Higher enrolment rates have taken their toll on the quality of infrastructure and teaching practice in Jordan. Overcrowding is more prevalent: 41% of Jordanian schools were found to be overcrowded in 2013 compared with 36% in 2011. Teacher/students ratios of 1:60 are commonplace in camps (Siam, 2004; MOPIC, 2014). Yet, school attendance is slightly better within camp schools compared with those in urban or rural settings, as is reflected by the latter’s higher dropout rates: 20% compared with 27% (table 4). In the camps, schools may be makeshift and overcrowding more severe. However, they are within walking distance, they operate the one shift system and Syrian volunteers assist Jordanian teachers.

In contrast, schools located in host communities are sometimes located far away from the refugees’ homes, thus necessitating unaffordable and ‘unsafe’ transportation. Moreover, in order to accommodate newly enrolled students, the number of double-shift schools has nearly doubled – from 50 to 98, leading to a general deterioration of educational quality for both Syrian and Jordanian children. As an STC staff member explains, ‘we are talking about children spending only three and a half hours at school in overcrowded classrooms comprising sometimes up to 70 children, so what kind of education will these children receive?’ In addition, ‘overcrowding exacerbates tensions between Jordanian and Syrian children, often erupting in bursts of violence inside schools’ (Interview JINT1, 2014).

Quality issues are acute in the afternoon shifts earmarked for Syrian refugees (52% of the total Syrian student population study in that shift): ‘Our afternoon shifts are of a much lower quality than the morning shifts: Several classes, such as the theatre classes, and amenities like libraries and resource rooms are not available for the afternoon shift’ (Interview JINT18, 2014). Moreover, according to FGD participants, most of the 2,800 teachers operating in the afternoon shift (out of the 7,000 additional teachers newly hired) are also unmotivated teachers who provide ‘entertainment’ rather than ‘academic teaching’ (FGD JFG03, 2014). This opinion is confirmed by STC staff: ‘Most teachers on the afternoon shift are inexperienced graduates hired on contract; few of them are trained and can take care of traumatised, depressed [or handicapped] children’ (Interview JINT16, 2014).

Several refugees have also testified to teachers exposing them to verbal and physical abuse, a phenomenon widely discussed by practitioners and official reports (FGD JFG01; JFG02;
The resulting feeling of discrimination has compounded the inherent difficulty in adapting to the Jordanian curriculum that is, according to most refugees and humanitarian practitioners interviewed, more advanced than the Syrian curriculum in the fields of English, Arabic expression, mathematics and science.

The unpleasant experiences children and their families have beyond the school walls have also had an impact on their capacity to engage in meaningful learning. Two different types of experience are common: violence exerted against them by Jordanian schoolboys/girls inside and outside school, prompting entire households to move to different locations, and the high rents imposed by Jordanian landlords that compel refugee families to look for cheaper housing in other localities (FGD JFG03, 2014). It is therefore no surprise that the educational level of Syrian refugees is said to be low; in particular, very few secondary students have passed the tawjihi examinations: three out of fifty-two candidates in 2013; even fewer refugees, 42, are to sit for the examinations in 2014, a fact that is rarely mentioned publicly (Ammon, 2014; Interview JINT10, 2014).

Despite these difficulties, refugee children aspire towards quality education and fruitful lives. However, they seldom define their future in Jordanian terms: return to a pacified, ‘Ba’ath-free’, Syria is their favoured option, followed by emigration. ‘Meeting the specific needs of adolescents and youth (roughly between 15 and 25) remains a clear gap in the Education Sector response in Jordan’ (ECWG, 2014). And as Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) staff bluntly put it: ‘It is a cute thing to see children go to school with their back packs; it is important, but nobody is talking about the youth and this is a major problem’ (Interview JINT14, 2014). Yet, several organisations have started addressing the needs of specific categories of refugees in that age range.

**Good practice in refugee youth education provision**

Educational assistance is developing in three major directions: first, improving the quality of formal and non-formal education; secondly, carving out a decent future for eligible and ineligible dropout children; thirdly, providing refugees with opportunities to pursue post-secondary education. In order to further improve the quality of education in schools with many Syrian refugees, several types of large-scale interventions are being led by UNICEF in collaboration with MOE.

School capacity is to be expanded in the next few years in order to accommodate those 32 thousand eligible children not yet enrolled. The challenge is compounded by the thousands of Jordanian children (35,000 in 2013) who move from private to public sector schools due to the deterioration of their living conditions (MOPI, 2014). Jordan has opted for the construction of schools in localities with a high refugee population instead of the gradual approach pursued so far by UNICEF, consisting of the installation of temporary prefab schools and the

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17 The situation seems to be better in UNRWA schools. Not only have they received relatively few refugees from Syria: about 800 Palestinians and 1,400 Syrians (accepted on behalf of an agreement with Jordan whereby non-Palestinian refugees may attend close UNRWA schools in exchange for Palestine refugees attending (closer) governmental schools. Moreover UNRWA has since the mid-2000s launched a reform programme notably focused on the behaviour of the teachers and the mainstreaming of civic culture in its educational programmes (Interview JINT11, 2014).
rehabilitation of existing schools. Jordan’s suggestion has not yet been heeded (Interview, JINT1, 2014).  

During 2013, 1,956 newly-appointed teachers teaching the afternoon shift and teachers in schools hosting large numbers of Syrian students received in-service and per-service teacher training. In addition, 450 officials from the Ministry of Education received training to build their capacity (UNESCO, 2013). Managed by the Queen Rania Teacher Academy (QRTA) but operated by experienced Jordanian teachers, the ongoing training programmes are designed to teach educational staff pedagogical and mentoring strategies tailored to the specific educational and psychosocial needs of the refugees and their host communities. Rooted in the concept of inclusive education, this provision is inspired by the standards for education in emergency and post-conflict situations as provided by the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) Minimum Standards.

Feedback on the programme has been positive, although it is too early to assess its medium-long term impact (Interview JINT3, 2014). In parallel, smaller teacher training schemes have mushroomed. For instance, in the Madrasati initiative’s remedial centres, 225 Syrian students and 140 teachers are being made aware of psychosocial issues (Madrasati working document, 2014). The British Council has taken the lead in improving English language teaching practice of Syrian volunteer teachers (in camps) and Jordanians (in local communities) for various providers such as Questscope and Jesuit Refugee Services.

Non-formal education targets Syrian and Jordanian young people aged between 13 and 18-20 years who, as mentioned above, cannot enrol in formal education and have missed at least one year of schooling or have never enrolled in formal education in Jordan. The two year ‘Drop Out Educating Programme’ co-managed by the MOE and Questscope (the one international NGO operating in this field) operates through the latter’s 47 centres. Upon completion, graduates receive official certification equivalent to a public school completion and can then pursue their studies as home schoolers up to the tawjihi (baccalaureate) level. Three other smaller NFE programmes cater for the specific needs of out-of-school children and young people offering home schooling and evening studies for 12+ years, as well as an adult education and literacy programme for those over 15 years.

In June 2013 Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW) launched a programme designed to get school leavers aged 7-16 back to school through accelerated learning programmes (ALP). Interestingly, IRW strove to tackle one of the principle causes of school dropout, namely relatively expensive rents, by contributing a JD30 (USD 42) per child per month to the landlord, in exchange for student enrolment in the programme. About 1,100 children are currently participating in this programme (discussion with IRW staff, 22/07/2014). All in all, 1,600 Syrians (about half of the total beneficiaries) were registered in these non-formal educational programmes; a relatively low figure due to the constraining schedule of the

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18 Within this framework, it is also worth highlighting the role of Mercy Corps (MC) in the promotion of the disabled children’s educational interests through the opening in public schools of ‘resource rooms’ designed to respond to the children’s specific disabilities, and the appointment of ‘shadow’ teachers, namely volunteers assisting disabled children in the camp schools regular classrooms (Interview JINT18, 2014).

19 Including participatory methods; see INEE Minimum Standards, in http://www.ineesite.org/en/minimum-standards

programmes, availability and cost of transportation and questions around recognition by the Syrian authorities of the certificate (Interview JINT15, 2014).

The significant numbers of Syrian children and youth left outside the formal and non-formal education streams has led a substantial number of NGOs to deliver informal education initiatives. As UNICEF staff explained:

…when children cannot be at school or do not meet the criteria to attend non-formal education, then there is a gap…and it is also very hard to prevent the drop out of a child who is placed with younger children. There are some glitches in the education system so that is why the informal education has popped up like that (Interview JINT8, 2014).

Informal education is a heterogeneous notion: programmes are not bound to a particular target group; the number of beneficiaries ranges from a few dozen to a few thousand throughout the year; organisations involved are diverse, from international specialised agencies to community-based organisations and even to individual ‘kuttabs’ who teach the Qur’an to children; and it covers various types of recreational, literacy and numeracy, religious, mentoring, technical and life skills, awareness raising, and even higher education activities. The immediate outcomes of these activities tend to be defined by informants in terms of ‘normalisation of refugees’ lives’, ‘restoration of dignity’, ‘inculcation of moral and religious values’ and ‘acquisition of proxy vocational and technical skills’ (Interviews JIINT2, JIINT3, JIINT7, JIINT12, JIINT14, JIINT15, JIINT17, JIINT21, 2014).

The impact of informal projects can often extend to the entire community when based on participatory methods involving parents and volunteers in the planning and/or the implementation of programmes (INEE, 2014). In so doing, it may become a tool for promoting the integration of urban refugees in Jordan. Indeed, one of the striking findings of the fieldwork is the social void within which Syrian refugees presently live: they have not yet re-created social/solidarity networks and, as discussed above, relationships with their Jordanian environment have remained tense (FGD JFG03, 2014). A negative aspect of NFE activities is a lack of accreditation from the MOE which can deter participation. Moreover, it is difficult to assess what impact they have as not all organisations include monitoring and evaluation procedures in the management of their programmes, and the existing coordination networks do not include all involved stakeholders.

The realisation of the difficulties encountered by Syrian refugees wishing to enrol in Jordanian universities has prompted Jordanian nationals to find alternative solutions outside Jordan. The number of Syrians attending university is currently 900, including non-refugees. Based on the refugee population in Jordan, an estimated 4,000 should be enrolled in Jordanian universities. In 2013, however, some 3,000 Syrian refugees complained that they could not register with Jordanian universities because they could not pay the fees imposed on foreign

21 School attached to a mosque, often elementary level education.
22 Children get paid 1 JD per session.
23 Remarkably, the Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS) has initiated an informal higher education programme open for youth aged 17 and above whatever their nationalities (only one Syrian for now but the number is expected to increase): ‘It’s kind of like higher education…our classes in English, interpretation and case management are not certified by the government but they get credits and this may help them resettle (for instance) to pursue their studies in the USA’ (Interview JINT13, 2014).
24 For an overview of existing assessment, M&E and coordination activities, see INEE 2014.
students and/or they did not have the sums needed to sustain themselves during their studies, and/or they did not have their previous school certificates with them (Interviews JINT5 2014; JINT21, 2014).

The enrolment of Syrian refugees in local universities has not been encouraged in Jordan because their university system is already overburdened. Since Syrians are not allowed to join alternative technical programmes (as long as they maintain their refugee status) the only solution left for would-be graduate refugees has been to find scholarship opportunities outside Jordan. But because related costs are high (including a subsistence allowance abroad) opportunities are far from satisfactory. For the academic year 2013–2014, UNHCR secured 40–60 scholarships through the German DAFI and Said Foundation scholarships whereas the number of applicants approached the 4,000 mark (Interview JINT9, 2014). There is a consensus amongst interviewees that only a regional solution may solve such an intractable issue. This implies an active role for the Jordanian Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE) (Interview JINT9, 2014). In the meantime, an EU-funded project targeting young refugees and Jordanians, offering skills development opportunities keeps the aspirations of refugee would-be graduates alive (Interview JINT21, 2014; UNESCO 2014).

Finally, efforts must be made to adapt and pursue Jordan’s pre-2011 education reform strategies by taking into account the specific material, legal, and psychological situation of the Syrian refugees. This entails prioritising quality over quantity and making decisions focused on the long-term operational relevance of emergency interventions such as the installation of prefab school buildings, the instauration of the double shift system, and the mass-recruitment of inexperienced and unmotivated teachers. In other words, ‘awareness about education amongst refugees and enrolment are a good thing, but the infrastructure must follow suit’ (Interview JINT6, 2014).

Lebanon

As of August 2014, Lebanon hosted over 1,142,000 refugees from Syria out of more than 2.8 million registered with the UNHCR in the five host countries (Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, and Lebanon) (UNHCR, 2014d). The figure is expected to rise to 1.5 million by December 2014. A significant number of refugees remain unregistered, estimated by the Ministry of Social Affairs to be around 500,000 (Watkins, 2013). Refugees are hosted in over 1,400 cadastral localities as follows: 28% in the North, 34% in the Beqaa, 26% in Beirut and Mount Lebanon, and 12% in the South (ILO, 2013). They experience extreme poverty and living conditions, especially the 85% who are hosted in the 250 most vulnerable areas of Lebanon that originally accommodated 68% of poor Lebanese (MEHE, 2014). 12.5% of refugees live in 400 informal tented settlements (ITS), and the rest are distributed in urban and rural refugee settlements and Palestinian camps across Lebanon (ibid).

Demographically, 62% of the refugee population are in the age group 0–24, and 42% of the UNHCR-registered population are aged between 3–18 years old (ILO, 2013; UNHCR, 2014d). The majority comes from Homs, Aleppo, Idleb, Deir Azzour and rural Damascus (Watkins, 2013). The UNRWA has reported registering 53,070 Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS), estimating the total number to be between 80,000 and 100,000 (UNRWA, 2014). The vast majority of PRS reside in Palestinian refugee camps across Lebanon.

Since the beginning of the crisis, Lebanon has maintained an ‘open border’ policy, despite the fact that it is neither a signatory of the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees nor its 1967 Protocol. Legally, the Syrian presence in Lebanon is governed by the 1993 bilateral agreement between Syria and Lebanon for Economic and Social Cooperation and
Coordination which granted freedom of stay, work, employment and economic activity for citizens of both countries. Practically, the implementation of these laws and regulations remains disorganised and confused, hence affecting major domains of life such as education (ILO, 2013).

Syrians have the legal right to work in Lebanon during the first six months of arrival, albeit without having access to the full benefits of the National Social Security Fund (NSSF). Theoretically, Syrians require work permits and business licenses to operate in Lebanon, but practically, the vast majority work in the informal sector and in small, unlicensed businesses without formal contracts. So far, the Lebanese government has shown a level of leniency and tolerance towards unregulated Syrian economic activity, despite the fact that only 2,067 Syrian workers have applied for work permits since the beginning of 2013 according to the Lebanese Minister of Labour Sajaan Kazzi (Al-Arab, 2014). However, the same Minister announced in May 2014 that the Lebanese government will soon issue a decree to organise the inflow of Syrian refugees into Lebanon and their activities in the country, and to establish Syrian refugee camps. He also confirmed that no work permits will be issued for foreigners including Syrians to work or start businesses that should be confined to the Lebanese (ibid).

ILO’s statistics reveal that 47% of working-age refugees from Syria are economically active, with the South witnessing the highest activity and Akkar the lowest (2013). 88% of working refugees work in unskilled jobs in the informal sector, such as agriculture, construction, street trades, domestic and personal services, and small, unlicensed businesses. Those employed operate in highly exploitative conditions with long working hours and an absence of any form of protection or social security. 92% of these workers have no work contracts, 56% work on a seasonal, weekly or daily basis, and only 23% work for monthly wages. The unemployment rate remains high: 30% among men and 68% among women. The average monthly income is 418,000 LL (USD 277) for males, and 248,000 LL (USD 164) for females with an evident gender gap of around 43% for women – even though most refugee households are female-headed due to the absence of males either because of death, joining the armed fight or remaining in Syria (ILO, 2013). Overall, educational attainment among refugees is low, with 1 out of 3 refugees either being illiterate or never having attended school. 40% of them have achieved primary education, and only 3% have achieved university education (ibid).

**Demand and supply of refugee youth education provision**

There are currently more than 630,000 school-aged (3-18 years)\textsuperscript{25} Syrian refugees in Lebanon, of which approximately 597,000 require educational assistance (Shuayb, 2014a). Around 66\% of these children and young people remain out of any form of education (MEHE, 2014), while only 30\% (189,000) have access to some form of education.\textsuperscript{26} According to UNRWA statistics, the number of PRS requiring education in Lebanon amounts to 42,000, of which 21,000 are registered with UNRWA, but only 7,200 receive educational assistance (Interview LINT07, 2014; UNHCR, 2013a).

A major limitation lies in the lack of statistics and studies focusing on refugee youth between 12-25 years. Numerous interviewees stated that monitoring and access to this age group is

\textsuperscript{25} School age is defined by the Education Working Group (EWG) in Lebanon as the 3-18 age group.

\textsuperscript{26} Children with access to education are geographically distributed as follows: 7\% in Beirut, 26\% in Mount Lebanon, 21\% in North, 29\% in Beqaa, 7.5 \% in South and 9.5 \% in Nabatieh (LCPS, 2013). The majority of them reside in the most disadvantaged areas in the mentioned governorates.
extremely difficult due to the lack of accurate information regarding their numbers, status and residential locations. The educational options currently available for Syrian school-age refugee youth is formal education for the 6-18 age group, non-formal education for the 3-18 age group, and vocational training for the 16-24 age group. The choice of programme depends on the young person’s age, educational level, financial situation and the availability of services in their area.

Until June 2014, a total of 90,000 Syrian children aged between 3-14 years were enrolled in first and second shifts at 980 out of 1,365 Lebanese public schools, with 51% being female and 49% being male (UNICEF, 2014; UNHCR, 2014c). In the 2013-2014 academic year, 79 public schools accommodated 32,000 Syrian students in the second shift following the ministerial decree 1513/M/2013 issued by the Lebanese Minister of Education Hassan Diab on November 18, 2013. With the opening of the second shift, the enrolment rate in formal education among school-aged refugees reached 12% in the primary cycle, and less than 5% in the secondary cycle. Among registered refugees, enrolment rates reached 38% in the primary cycle, and a mere 2% in the secondary cycle (MEHE, 2014). UNHCR and UNICEF covered all expenses of the second shift, including tuition fees, teacher salaries, books, stationery and transportation, with an average cost of USD 630 per student. In total, MEHE had spent around USD 60 million of donor money by the end of 2013 on accommodating Syrian students in public schools (ibid).

The second shift starts at 14:30 in the afternoon once the first shift ends, and lasts for around 4 hours. A simplified and Arabised version of the Lebanese curriculum is taught (except for Cycle 3), which only includes English, Arabic, Maths and Sciences due to time limitations. Lebanese teachers (contractual and permanent) exclusively staff the second shift due to legal regulations. This system played a significant role in lowering access barriers for Syrian children, but has also introduced a number of challenges. The second shift will continue for the 2014-2015 academic year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education level</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kindergarten (0 to 5 years)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary (6 to 10 years)</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate (11 to 15 years)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary (16 to 18 years)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Gross Enrolment Rates in formal education in Lebanon by educational level and sex (%) (Courtesy of ILO, 2013)

According to an assessment by Global Communities in 2013, the average daily income for a Syrian refugee family is USD 15, and hence only a minority of middle and upper class Syrian families can afford to register their children in Lebanese private schools. Those who cannot cover fees have the option to register in Syrian private schools that are either free or charge a minimal fee, if circumstances allow. These schools are characterised by a flexible curriculum and foreign language approach, and recruit both Lebanese and Syrian teachers, hence

27The fees of private schools in Lebanon range from between USD 500, up to USD 12,000 per pupil per year depending on the school reputation and level, and the educational cycle (elementary, intermediate, secondary). Some private schools are semi-private (supported by politicians or charity, or religious institution) so are more affordable, costing approximately USD 300-400 per pupil per year.
facilitating education for Syrian students. In 2013-2014, the number of Syrian students registered in Syrian private schools reached 11,000. This included very few students aged over 15 years registered in Lebanon (Shuayb, 2014a).

These Syrian schools in the North and the Beqaa are predominantly politicised schools of Islamic character, funded by certain states and aligned with Syrian opposition movements. Interviewees reported that some Islamic organisations in Akkar and the Beqaa provide Syrian parents with food and cash to ‘motivate’ them to register their children in their schools. These schools teach the curriculum of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces (NCS), which is the same as the Syrian official curriculum with an amended history book and the omission of the Qawmiyah book.28

The main gap is that these schools are unaccredited, and hence, Grade 9 and 12 students have to travel to Turkey to sit for the official exam and obtain a certificate from the NCS which is unrecognised in Lebanon. Additionally, many students jeopardise their academic future by being unable to travel to Turkey. These schools have limited popularity due to being unaccredited, and due to security concerns among parents who fear that registering with schools linked to the opposition might endanger them upon return to Syria (Shuayb, 2014a).

A second type of private schooling is delivered through Syrian schools operated by former Syrian principals who fled to Lebanon. These schools teach the Syrian official curriculum, and use connections in Syria to send their students to sit an exam and obtain the official Syrian certificate. A small number of Grade 9 and 12 students benefited from these schools, such as in the case of one girl in a Beirut FGD who studied in a Syrian school in Lebanon, travelled to Syria to obtain her Grade 9 certificate in Syria, returned to Beirut and registered in a Lebanese public school (FGD LFG01, 2014). In most cases, however, students are unable to enter Syria due to personal and security reasons, and hence they cannot obtain certification for their academic year.

A third type of private schools are those that have started teaching the Libyan curriculum after connecting with the Libyan Examination Board Committee in Turkey, where students can obtain official Libyan certificates after sitting for Libyan Grade 9 and 12 exams. Students at these schools study the Syrian curriculum in all grades, switching to the Libyan curriculum in Grades 9 and 12 in order to sit for the Libyan exam in Turkey (Shuayb, 2014a).

According to UNRWA, their schools host around 7,200 (6-15 year olds) out of 42,000 school-aged PRS (Interview INT07, 2014; Shuayb, 2014). Similar to public schools, UNRWA schools started second shifts enrolling 4,500 students who will be moved to the first shift next year. Until May 2014, UNRWA schools taught their own remedial curriculum in English, Maths and Arabic, then started teaching the Lebanese curriculum in July while proceeding with remedial classes (Interview LINT07, 2014). UNRWA students can sit the official exams in Lebanon and obtain official certificates, but usually struggle to pass due to the poor quality of education at UNRWA schools.

Non-Formal Education (NFE) comprises a wide range of educational programmes such as Accelerated Learning Programmes (ALP), Community-Based Education (CBE), remedial classes, Basic Literacy and Numeracy (BLN), catch-up programmes and psychosocial activities (See Annex 2). This type of education aims to prepare children who have been out of school

28 Qawmiyah book is the equivalent of the national education civics book, a Ba’ath-based course that forms part of the official Syrian curriculum.
for 2-3 years to reintegrate into education and eventually return to formal schooling. It also provides students in formal schools with academic support through initiatives like ‘homework clubs’. According to UNHCR statistics, 33% of the educational response falls within the non-formal category (UNHCR, 2014c), and until June 2014, a total of 70,000 Syrian children were reached with NFE (UNHCR, 2014e). In Beirut FGD, 3 out of 9 participants were public school students, but were simultaneously attending remedial classes and homework clubs at a Syrian NGO (FGD LFG01, 2014).

The majority of NGOs working in education provide NFE, but very few of them manage to enrol children in formal education afterwards. For instance in 2013-2014, War Child Holland was able to register only 750 out of 2000 children aged between 5-13 years in formal schools in the North (Interview LINT03, 2014). This year, the organisation has not managed yet to register any of the 3,000 children receiving NFE at its centres. Other examples include Basmeh and Zeitooneh that enrolled only 50 out of 300 children, and Sawa for Syria that enrolled only 120 out of 1000 children in public schools (Interviews LINT02 and LINT05, 2014).

Certain NGOs like Alphabet teach Syrian-Jordanian NFE modules with the exception of English and Maths given the level of difficulty of these subjects (Interview LINT04, 2014). At the time of writing this report, no accredited NFE curriculum exists in Lebanon, but a joint project is currently being developed by UNICEF, MEHE and the Centre for Educational Research and Development (CRDP) to produce accredited ALP and psychosocial support modules for children affected by the Syrian refugee crisis. This project targets primary and secondary cycles, and addresses topics like bullying, war trauma, verbal and sexual violence, self-confidence and team work. Generally, NFE curricula are flexible, easy and tailored to address the children’s academic level and psychosocial needs.

One Community-Based Education (CBE) programme constructed and opened a camp school in Sahal Miniarah’s refugee camp in the Bekaa (Interview LINT09, 2014). The camp school teaches the Lebanese curriculum and accepts students from neighbouring camps. Despite it being unaccredited, this programme will be expanded through a new complex that is currently under construction to accommodate 300 children (aged 6-14 years) in full-time education by October 2014 (ibid). NFE represents a strongly needed outlet for distressed and traumatised refugee children, but simultaneously it imposes challenges that will be investigated in the upcoming section reviewing gaps in refugee youth education provision.

The concentration on primary education for refugee children is starkly contrasted with a lack of attention to educational provision for Syrian youth (16-24 years) such as vocational training. Only four interviewed organisations (Basmeh and Zeitooneh; Sawa for Syria; UNESCO and UNRWA) offered non-formal TVET, and only one offered accredited vocational training29 (Makhzoumi Foundation), with very low numbers of beneficiaries (Interviews LINT02; LINT05; LINT06; LINT07; LINT12; 2014). In total, less than 6% of Syrians aged 16-24 have participated in some form of vocational training (UNFPA et al., 2014). At UNRWA, only 25 students out of 200 applicants were accepted in vocational training due to limited capacity (Interview LINT07, 2014). NFE programmes for adults last between a few days and two weeks, and include literacy and numeracy skills, English language, and skill development workshops. As for formal vocational training, courses usually run for a

29Formal vocational training lasts for 3 months and includes hair dressing, spa management, accounting, languages, mobile reparation and computer reparation, and costs from $80 to 200$. Non-formal vocational training includes chocolate making, candle making, and flower arranging. They last from 2 to 3 days, and cost around $50.
couple of months and aim at teaching students a specific vocation, granting them an official certificate at the end.

Despite the fact that numerous interviewees expressed serious concerns, many stated that they have tried to connect with vocational training centres to enrol Syrian youth but the number of interested individuals was very low. This claim is difficult to validate due to a lack of statistics and surveys that focus on this age group, but participants in Saida and the Beqaa FGDs expressed high levels of interest in free vocational training that suits their needs and living conditions, as it would allow them to learn a profession and work at the same time (FGDs LFG02; LFG03, 2014). Simultaneously, they expressed frustration at having benefitted from neither education provision nor outreach efforts, in contrast to their younger peers who had these services.

Children with special needs and disabilities are legally entitled to register in some public schools yet the vast majority of them do not, given that schools are not equipped to provide them with the specific care and support they require. The same level of indifference is shown towards Syrian refugee youth with special needs who suffer from the absence of any targeted educational programmes that cater for them. Out of all the NGOs mapped, only War Child Holland provided psychosocial support to 10 Syrian refugee children and young people with autism (Interview LINT03, 2014).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School-aged Syrian refugee children in Lebanon (3-18)</th>
<th>~630,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School-aged refugee children requiring educational assistance</td>
<td>~597,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children with access to education</td>
<td>~189,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children out of any form of education</td>
<td>~415,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children enrolled in public schools (3-14)</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children enrolled in private schools (3-14)</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children enrolled in NFE (3-14)</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adolescents in vocational training (16-24)</td>
<td>Less than 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRS requiring education in Lebanon</td>
<td>~42,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRS registered with UNRWA</td>
<td>21,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRS with access to education</td>
<td>7,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Key figures in education for Syrian refugees and PRS in Lebanon

Gaps in refugee youth education provision
The living conditions of refugees matched with the socio-political conditions in the region and the absence of clear governmental strategies impose numerous challenges in different domains, specifically refugee youth education. Cross-cutting issues including security concerns; constant mobility; documentation and shelter problems; child labour; poverty; and

The majority of interviewed NGOs named transportation as a major gap, especially for NGOs providing NFE. Transportation costs can reach USD 20 per month for children living 2 to 3 miles from school (Watkins, 2013), which is unaffordable for the majority of Syrian families. In many rural areas, girls are much less likely to enrol in the afternoon shift where no transportation is available due to safety concerns. Additionally, numerous areas suffer deteriorating security conditions such as Wadi Khaled in the North, and Hermel, Labweh, and Aarsal in Beqaa. Explosions, armed fights and random missiles falling on schools or around them frequently interrupt education in these areas.
malnutrition heavily affect access to and quality of education. A number of interviewees reported that many Syrian parents refuse to send their children to be educated outside the camps fearing for their safety.

Additionally, Syrian refugees who are unregistered with UNHCR are neither counted nor monitored in statistics and surveys; these people remain ‘unreachable’ by services. Despite this reality, it is possible to identify gaps that are specific to each type of education, but it is crucial to first analyse the major barriers to access to education, and the absence of a national educational strategy.

According to a UN joint assessment, 66% of school-aged Syrian children are not attending school, and only 30% have access to some form of education (MEHE, 2014). Another UN inter-agency vulnerability assessment revealed that 46% of Syrian households have at least one child out of school, with 57% citing financial shortage as the main reason among numerous other reasons (ibid).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cannot afford school fees</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No places in schools or no schools nearby</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too late for school registration</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulty following the curriculum and the foreign language</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not want to attend school</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consider school not safe</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not registered with UNHCR</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child is working</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other reasons, including convictions that school has no value, work is more rewarding, or girls must not attend school to take care of younger siblings.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Reasons for school aged refugees not being enrolled in formal education in Lebanon (%) (Courtesy of ILO, 2013)

Financial distress led many children and young people to drop out and become child labourers to support their families. Only a small minority of them can find the time and energy to attend a few non-formal classes per week, as in the case of 4 out of 8 children in Saida FG, and 3 out of 9 in Beirut FGD (FGDs LFG01; LFG02, 2014). These children work as street traders or in grocery and mechanics shops. According to a study by ILO, 60% of 10-14 year old children do not attend school, 50% of them are looking for a job, and 8% already work and do not attend school (2013). In addition to employment, homeless refugee children beg for money or food on the streets and shelter in dilapidated buildings. This highly disadvantaged group known by some NGOs as ‘street children’ attract very minimal attention, resulting in thousands of children missing out on education.

The adolescent age group (15-18 years) is characterised by very low formal education enrolment rates (less than 5%), and high dropout rates (over 20%) (Interview LINT01, 2014) that start in Grade 7 and then rapidly increase throughout Grade 9 and the secondary cycle. Only 11% of this age group attempted to resume their education in Lebanon. Many drop out due to financial shortages, documentation issues, the difficulty of the curriculum and foreign language and the unavailability of transportation (UNFPA et al., 2014). Others drop out with
the intention of finding a job or getting married.\textsuperscript{31} According to Shuayb, the majority of adolescents from Syria has a negative perception of schools due to the aforementioned reasons, and hence, do not even attempt to register (2014). An assessment conducted by UN agencies revealed that 33\% of 15-24 year old Syrian refugees were forced out of education due to the crisis and 47\% of them are currently working or looking for work to support their families (UNFPA et al., 2014). For instance, one participant in the Beqaa FGD obtained his Baccalaureate in 2010 with excellent grades and had a strong desire to pursue higher education, yet had to drop out of education to find a job (FGD LFG03, 2014).

Moreover, refugee youth aged between 16 to 24 years are highly disadvantaged owing to vastly insufficient educational services. In the Beqaa FGD, all participants aged between 14-24 who were unemployed and out of education expressed extreme frustration, reporting that no education providers had approached them to offer services (FGD LFG03, 2014). Some of the participants had tried to approach NGOs providing NFE in the camps they live in, but were rejected due to their age. Others expressed enthusiasm in enrolling in vocational training, but did not know of any NGOs that offered it for free.

High unemployment rates take their toll on refugee young people by threatening income, lowering standards of living and creating material and psychological barriers that discourage them from pursuing education. According to an ILO study, unemployment rates among young Syrians exceed 50\%, with only 6\% of +15 females working (2013). This information confirms the Beqaa FGD’s findings, wherein all participants have failed to find jobs, and remain unable to return to Syria where they would be forced to undertake military service (FGD LFG03, 2014).

This situation, coupled with discrimination, humiliation, harassment\textsuperscript{32} and potential violence outside the camps led many young refugees to remain in camps in poverty and distress,\textsuperscript{33} in a state of limbo with neither employment nor educational opportunities available to them. As explained by a young man from Syria:

\begin{quote}
We are too old for the school here. I do not work, I sleep until 4:00 pm! I tried to work in Beirut but could not find any jobs. Agricultural work is for girls, and it can barely cover my tobacco expenses! I can’t return to Syria, because I am called for military service there (FGD LFG03, 2014).
\end{quote}

According to a study by Mercy Corps, many boys between 14 and 24 fixate on the notion of returning to Syria and joining the armed struggle due to the hopelessness they experience in Lebanon (2014). These sentiments were clearly echoed by participants in the Beqaa FGD (FGD LFG03, 2014). Additionally, one NGO worker voiced serious concerns about what he called ‘child trafficking\textsuperscript{34}’ and ‘child soldiers’ especially in the Beqaa and North of Lebanon.

\textsuperscript{31} 23\% of males and 64\% of females between the ages of 19-24 opted for early marriages, while 18\% of females between 15-18 years married (UNFPA et al. 2014).
\textsuperscript{32} One participant in the Beqaa FGD had worked as a taxi driver in Beirut to support his family, but was harassed by some passengers and policemen who would interrogate him and confiscate his driving licence (Focus Group FG03, 2014).
\textsuperscript{33} According to UNFPA assessment, 89\% of young Syrians surveyed described themselves as suffering mental and psychological disorders like depression and anxiety, and 24\% thought of ending their own lives (UNFPA et al., 2014).
\textsuperscript{34} “Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of...
Similarly, UNRWA reported being unable to reach out to around 2,500 PRS who either registered in Islamic schools or returned to fight in Syria (Interview LINT07, 2014). All these factors strongly affect the ability of Syrian children and adolescents to access education and remain in it, resulting in low enrolment rates and high dropout rates that may vary across age groups, social class, gender, area of residence, and available services. In return, the lack of education leads them into exploitative labour markets or other paths putting future prospects and lives at risk.

The absence of a comprehensive national strategy by the Lebanese government to manage the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon, especially in terms of an education response, creates further barriers regarding legal status, entry requirements and tests, placement criteria, curriculum and foreign language approach, and educational strategies for the coming years. For instance, many public school principals are confused about registration and placement criteria for Syrian children, and end up making ad hoc decisions based on personal assessments of students’ educational future (Interview LINT01, 2014). In June 2014, MEHE endorsed but had not yet adopted ‘Reaching All Children with Education in Lebanon’ strategy (RACE) presented by UNICEF and UNHCR to reach to 413,000 Syrian refugees and vulnerable Lebanese school-aged children and young people between 3-18 years by 2016. If adopted, RACE will require a total of USD 599 million to be implemented (MEHE, 2014).

Significant education-related expenses are taking their toll on MEHE and other education stakeholders. In 2013-2014, the cost of education for 90,000 students in public schools reached USD 183 million, and is expected to rise to $348-434 million in 2014-2015 to cover the expected enrolment of between 140,000 to 180,000 Syrian students in public schools (World Bank, 2013). It remains unclear if such a significant sum will be secured. Similarly, the majority of NGOs interviewed expressed financial concerns, indicating a risk of closing down or limiting their activities if no funding is secured.

The majority of public schools still use learning by rote, non-interactive and non-participatory, teacher-centred approaches. This, among other factors, has resulted in only 29.2% of Lebanese students enrolling in public schools, and the student level is 10% lower than that of private school students. Moreover, Grade 9 exam results show a 55% success rate in public schools compared with 74% in private schools, and a national repetition rate of 18.2% among public school students (MEHE, 2014). In UNRWA schools, the Grade 9 success rate drops to 13% only (Shuayb, 2014a).

In the second shift, the quality of education is even more compromised given the shorter time frame (4 hours per day), the complex needs of Syrian students, and the fact that 47% of second shift teachers are first-time teachers with no prior experience or training on pedagogy, teaching methods or classroom management (Interview LINT01, 2014). In the Beirut FGD, Syrian children who attend public schools spoke of recurrent absences by teachers, bad tempers and weak teaching skills (FGD LFG01, 2014). One girl reported that her English teacher was absent for 10 days in a row with no teacher replacement provided.

This poor quality teaching is aggravated by the lack of educational support from parents at home who are either illiterate, do not know foreign languages, or are too busy to follow up on their children’s academic needs. The major gap is the recruitment of inexperienced, untrained
and unprepared teaching staff for the second shift; they remain unable to respond to the complex academic and psychosocial needs of Syrian students, despite the good-will of some. In addition, poor school infrastructure, deteriorated WASH facilities and the lack of any usable recreational facilities affect the overall educational experience for all public school students, especially with the pressure imposed by the second shift on available facilities.

A UNICEF study in 2012 showed that the incidence of violence in classrooms reaches 70.4% (MEHE 2014). In line with this information, children in the Beirut FGD reported being subject to violence at school, including verbal abuse and corporal punishment by teachers and principals, or being discriminated against by their classmates (FGD LFG01, 2014). In the Saida FGD, children spoke of serious cases of violence such as being beaten with wooden rods by bus drivers, being locked up in the classroom and being banned from drinking water or going to the bathroom (FGD LFG02, 2014).

Intra-Syrian bullying and aggression also occurs on the basis of sectarian and regional affiliations and political disagreements. Additionally, cases of depression, anxiety, PTSD, introversion and even suicide attempts by some Syrian students in second shifts have been reported (Interview LINT01, 2014). Segregation in the classroom and the lack of any mixed extra-curricular activities (sports, music/art classes) for Syrian and Lebanese students hinder any potential integration; this only serves to worsen the psychosocial environment at school. A major identified gap is the lack of any referral systems and the absence of trained staff (social workers, professional psychologists, health experts) who can administer psychosocial support in schools. Additionally, the absence of any child protection and safeguarding systems allow bullying and school violence to continue.35

All interviewees named the rigidity of the curriculum and instruction in foreign language as the main barriers to access to education for children from Syria. Teaching Maths and Sciences in English in the second shift has led many students in Cycle 3 (Grades 7-9) to drop out. In the Beirut and Saida FGDs, all children who have been to Lebanese public schools experienced major difficulties with Maths and Sciences, and wished that all disciplines would be taught in Arabic (FGDs LFG01; LFG02, 2014). Despite a number of innovative solutions such as translating teaching materials and teaching second shift classes in Arabic, this major gap continues to affect Syrian students in the absence of a long-term strategy to counter it.

Lebanon has 1,365 public schools, most of which are located in Akkar, the Beqaa and the South, with the highest concentration of Lebanese students and Syrian refugees who attend the same schools. This renders schools inaccessible or overcrowded, resulting in 37,289 Syrian students on ‘waiting lists’ in 2013 (Daou, 2014). Contrary to this information, Shuayb insists that public schools in the North, South and some areas of the Beqaa and Greater Beirut still have a decent absorption capacity, and that principals were still registering Syrian children until MEHE requested that they stop the intake due to financial reasons (Interview LINT13, 2014). Additionally, MEHE did not approve the opening of second shifts in all the schools that were suggested by UNHCR and UNICEF based on registration trends and refugee concentration.

35 In one case only, Caritas was capable of getting a public school headmaster fired by MEHE based on a complaint issued by Syrian parents about the headmaster beating their child (Interview LINT11, 2014).
This apparent inability and/or refusal of some public schools to register more Syrian children based on claims of a lack of capacity is a major gap. These claims cannot be verified due to MEHE’s prohibition of any non-governmental actors from accessing schools to monitor the registration process, including those funding the second shift. Furthermore, duplicated names and errors in enrolment lists render it difficult to assess the real capacity of schools.

Another key issue is the rigidity of bureaucratic requirements and the lack of any alternative solutions for those who do not possess the required documents. Grade 9 and 12 Syrian students are allowed to sit official exams, but cannot receive official certificates by MEHE until they provide all required documents including ID, passport, and transcripts and attestations of previous enrolment in Syria. In most cases, refugee students do not possess all these documents, and hence, either end up skipping the official exam, or are deprived of certificates and consequently forced to drop out, as illustrated in an FGD when a girl explained: ‘I did not register in a public school because they requested many documents which we did not have the time to obtain. Instead, I registered in an NGO, they teach us Qur’an’ (FGD LFG01, 2014).

UNRWA’s Chief Field Education Officer reported that 200 UNRWA students of Grades 9 and 12 were not allowed to sit for the official exam due to bureaucratic issues, which caused them to be demotivated and then to drop out; only 70 of them were able to sit for the exam in Syria (Interview LINT07, 2014). The failure of the majority of these schools to provide accredited certification is either due to teaching non-Lebanese curriculums (Syrian, National Coalition’s or Libyan), or to other complications. For instance, in the Tripoli FGD, all participants reported being unable to obtain a Grade 9 official certificate from MEHE despite passing the official exam, due to MEHE’s request that their school attestations be certified by the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then by the Syrian Embassy in Lebanon (FGD LFG04, 2014).

Such conditions are impossible to meet for students of these schools given their alignment with the NCS and certain donor countries. Some participants ended up studying Grade 10 without having received their Grade 9 certificate. In schools that teach the Libyan curriculum, many students were unable to travel to Turkey to sit for the Libyan official exam due to not having passports, and being unable to apply for ones at the Syrian Embassy out of fear for their safety. One participant managed to sit the exam in Turkey but has not received her certificate yet. She was very concerned that Lebanese universities would not acknowledge the certificate, as was the case with her classmate (FGD LFG04, 2014).

Curriculum confusion is another important factor that compromises the quality of education in these schools. For instance, students in the Libyan curriculum schools study the Syrian curriculum in all grades then switch to the Libyan curriculum in Grades 9 and 12 to be able to sit the exam in Turkey. These private schools rely on aid and funding from certain countries, and are hence politicised and Islamicised. Additionally, they remain at risk of closure due to funding cuts. As a result of cuts in aid, some of these schools end up imposing fees between 135,000 LL (USD 90) and 250,000 LL (USD 166) for tuition and books, which are unaffordable for the majority of refugee families.

Generally speaking, NFE programmes tend to lack the crucial structural connection with formal education that allows students to re-enrol in formal education after reaching a certain

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36 The Libyan Examination Board Committee had refused to conduct the official exam in Lebanon due to the security situation, and alternatively requested that students go to Turkey to sit for it.
academic level. A strategy and mechanism to embed NFE in formal education is still missing. The lack of accreditation can discourage youth from enrolling and affects their educational journey as well. In the same vein, without a structured curriculum and improvised lessons the quality of NFE can be compromised, especially given that a number of interviewees reported a level of nonchalance among facilitators. This is aggravated by the absence of any efficient monitoring and evaluation system that can ensure commitment to specific educational and psychosocial standards.

There are capacity issues with NGOs offering limited places, and very few can accommodate more than a few hundred children in their own centres. For instance, Basmeh and Zeitooneh had 300 children registered in their school, and 250 on the waiting list (Interview LINT02, 2014). Furthermore, many NGOs have not succeeded yet in developing efficient outreach strategies to the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups such as child labourers, ‘street children’, and young refugees living in remote rural areas and camps. The few NGOs that provide TVET are still unable to tailor programmes that suit the complex situation and needs of young refugees. Moreover, the lack of any provision of transportation by some NFE programmes aggravates the outreach problem by excluding children who cannot afford to pay for transportation.

Large-scale TVET programmes or any other form of skill development programmes for the 16-24 age group remain woefully absent. There is an evident prioritisation of primary education by donors and funders, and the scarcity of funds allocated to TVET. This fund shortage forces NGOs such as the Makhzoumi Foundation to stop enrolling young people in vocational programmes, leaving tens of applications on the waiting list (Interview LINT12, 2014). Generally, many NFE initiatives continue to rely on aid and volunteering and hence, remain at risk of financial and staff shortages. Even small-scale sporadic initiatives attract only a very small number of adolescents because of logistics, financial and security reasons, as well as the lack of interest among the majority of adolescent and young refugees due to perceived limited value in TVET, hopelessness, employment or marriage. Additionally, bureaucratic obstacles continue to prohibit young refugees from enrolling in formal vocational programmes. For instance, Caritas has failed to enrol a number of refugees aged over 16 in public vocational institutions due to documentation issues (Interview LINT11, 2014).

**Good practices in refugee youth education provision**

MEHE’s decision to open up public schools in two shifts and to cover all school expenses by UNHCR and UNICEF provided 90,000 Syrian children with access to formal education. The second shift system succeeded in lowering foreign language barriers for Syrian children through teaching a simplified Arabicised curriculum (except for Cycle 3) along with introductory French and English classes. Additionally, the provision of transportation by UNHCR and UNICEF helped many pupils register and attend school regularly. Similarly, UNRWA’s decision to open up its schools to PRS in two shifts granted access to thousands. Moreover, its strategy to use the second shift as a remedial tool for refugee students to catch up with the curriculum before moving them to the first shift starting October 2015 is an example that can be followed by Lebanese public schools. MEHE’s decision to give Grade 9 Syrian and PRS students the option to sit for the official exam in Arabic, and despite not possessing all required documents is a significant step.

Private schools seem to be the most flexible option capable of catering for the needs of Syrian students regarding the curriculum and foreign languages. For instance, one school in Saida has innovatively translated textbook pages into Arabic, so that students can read English content on one page, and its Arabic translation on the opposite one. In the Tripoli FGD,
participants reported receiving very good treatment from teachers, and finding the Arabicised Lebanese curriculum easy to study (FGD LFG04, 2014). Furthermore, registered private schools that teach the Lebanese curriculum can provide accredited certification and they usually recruit a combination of Lebanese and Syrian teachers who are capable of responding to the complex needs of Syrian students. Some of these schools provide school materials and transportation for their students as well.

Despite the gravity of the challenges facing NFE, certain good practices arise such as Najda Now’s joint project with ‘Allimni’ that aims to combat child labour through providing cash support to parents to send their children to school instead of the labour market (Interview INT08, 2014). Another significant initiative is International Rescue Committee’s (IRC) ‘Street and Working Children’ programme that provides this disadvantaged group with psychosocial activities and case management services, in centres and tents located in refugee communities to avoid transportation costs. One criticism often levelled at NFE is that it lacks accreditation and onward progression for students. However, MEHE is currently working with UNICEF on a project to design an accredited ALP 4-month programme that would allow students to join formal education afterwards. War Child Holland is also planning to open a specialised school in the Beqaa to teach this programme to 500 Syrian children per year, amounting to 1,500 throughout the 3-year project (Interview LINT03, 2014).

NGOs offering NFE fill a major gap by providing access to education for thousands of children who would otherwise be in the labour market or on the streets. Additionally, NFE programmes do not impose any bureaucratic requirements on young people. NFE is flexible and capable of catering for children and youth with different needs, educational backgrounds and learning abilities through a range of programmes (ALP, catch-up, remedial classes and CBE). It also offers academic support to children enrolled in public and private schools through initiatives like homework clubs, literacy and numeracy classes and foreign language courses. For instance, Sawa for Syria has started a second shift system specializing in 10-13 year old students enrolled in public schools to support them with mathematics, sciences, English and Arabic (Interview LINT05, 2014). NFE education comprises psychosocial support activities that are crucial for children living in extreme conditions after surviving a brutal war in Syria and can be facilitated by both Syrian and Lebanese facilitators, some of whom are professionals in psychology, pedagogy and child education. NFE’s flexibility allows creative initiatives that tackle specific groups like child labourers such as Relief and Reconciliation’s ‘Work and Learn’ scheme that targets working children who are interested in education (Interview LINT09, 2014). This scheme is administered over four hours per week, and involves a BLN programme and language courses.

A significantly good practice is providing accredited TVET for free, as in the case of Makhzoumi Foundation which offers this service in six different locations in Lebanon. Makhzoumi also provides its students with internship opportunities upon graduation with USD 150 transportation cash assistance, allowing them to gain practical experience. This programme also stood out for prioritizing marginalised refugee groups such as LGBTIqs and women surviving gender-based violence (Interview LINT12, 2014). Given its rarity, it can be considered a good practice to provide even basic educational programmes that target adolescents such as UNESCO’s comprehensive youth programme ’YES’ (14-25 years), and Basmeh and Zeitooneh’s basic literacy, English and computer skills programme targeting refugee youth aged between 20 and 35 years (Interviews LINT06; LINT02, 2014).
Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)

As of 30 June 2014, the number of registered Syrian refugees in Iraq was 220,210 (UNHCR, 2014b). Of these nearly all reside in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), with only 7,733 refugees living in other areas in Iraq, mainly in Anbar province. There are over 103,000 Kurdish refugees from Syria residing in Duhok province. The majority of these live in four camps, Akre with 1,398, Bajid Kandala with 310, Gawilan with 2,559 and Domiz, the largest with 69,033 resident refugees. Sulaymaniyah province has only one camp, Arbat, which is home to 3,500 refugees while 22,519 refugees have self-settled and live outside the camp. The capital, Erbil province, hosts 86,974 registered refugees. There are four camps in this province: Basirma with 3,044 individuals, Darshakran with 7,699 individuals, Kawergosk with 8,935 individuals, and Qushtapa with 4,243 individuals (UNHCR, 2014b).

The historical relations between Kurdish communities that transcend national borders, geographical proximity and national and ethnic bonds were major factors that encouraged Kurdish refugees from Syria to seek refuge in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). The signs of national and ethnic solidarity are easily visible. A member of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) explicitly states this in an interview, describing all Kurds as part of one nation who empathise with one another as in the case of the Syria crisis (Interview KINT04, 2014). Effectively, refugees from Syria are allowed to access the same social services as host communities and are availed of the right to work (Refugees International, 2012).

Iraq is not a signatory to the Geneva Convention but as a nation it operates an open border policy for refugees. Despite the hospitality extended to refugees from Syria, many face considerable challenges accessing services in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). Among the complex, interlinked challenges is education, specifically secondary level education for refugee youth. From field research throughout Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) it quickly became apparent that young men and women are being deprived of education and training. Leaving refugee youth with limited opportunities for future education and employment is already negatively affecting those young people and will have long-term effects on Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and the region.

Demand and supply of refugee youth education provision

From discussions with refugee youth in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and interviews with practitioners it is clear that the majority of young refugees are eager to pursue their studies. The aspiration to re-enter education and attain certification was high among research participants in spite of the numerous challenges they face in the host community. The Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) Ministry of Education and Ministry of Higher Education oversee refugee education provision in collaboration with local and international NGOs. In Erbil governorate’s refugee camp, 4,610 students receive basic schooling.

There are no secondary schools in the camp therefore currently 975 students are registered for high schools in Erbil city. Secondary schools in Dara Shakran and Kawergosk camps are planned to be open for the 2014-2015 academic year (ibid). In Domiz camp, a secondary school was constructed and opened in March 2014, enabling 600 students to re-commence their formal education (Walker, 2014). Run by the MOE, this school heralds the much needed construction of secondary schools with further construction underway in Kawergosk, Darashakran and Arbat camps (Walker, 2014).

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)’s survey on access to basic education in non-camp areas shows that only 10% of school-age children access schooling. To illustrate the extent of secondary educational exclusion, of the 58 refugee young people who participated in the
mapping exercise in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), none were in formal secondary education and three were attending formal basic education (FGD KFG01; KFG02; KFG03 and KFG04). In the refugee camps, most classrooms are tented but these are gradually being replaced by pre-fabricated structures to improve temperature control for students and teachers (Walker, 2014; UNHCR, 2014a).

In Erbil, the capital of Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), there are a total of 18 basic schools where Arabic is the language of instruction: 13 in the city of Erbil, three in the suburbs (Ankawa), one in Koysinjaq (about 55km east of Erbil city) and one in Makhmoor (about 60km south of Erbil), serving 2,851 refugee students (Interview KINT04, 2014). For secondary schools teaching in Arabic, there are six secondary schools in Erbil, four located in the city of Erbil and two in Ankawa serving 308 refugee students.

60% of refugees in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) have self-settled and live outside the designated refugee camps (UNHCR, 2014a; Save the Children, 2013). For example in Sulaymaniyah province, only 512 refugee households reside in its camp, Arbat with the remainder living in the city. While self-settled refugees are permitted unwarranted access to public schools, language of instruction is a major barrier. Almost all Syrian youth if given the choice would opt to learn in the Arabic schools, however, only 1% of schools have Arabic as the language of instruction. Language is therefore the primary problem, hindering learning for Syrian refugees to enter schools (Interview KINT10, 2014).

The majority of public and private schools are in the Erbil governorate, whereas refugee communities tend to live in more affordable areas away from the capital. As a result students must travel long distances, incurring costs many cannot afford and thus excluding a large proportion of refugee youth from education (UNESCO, 2013c). For those in school, overcrowding is common with 35-45 students per classroom. More teachers are needed to decrease teacher student ratios (UNESCO, 2013c).

The KRG’s policy is to minimise its self-settled refugee population, urging refugees to reside in designated refugee camps (Interview KINT09, 2014). It seems that the main reason behind this government policy is security, with the government more able to monitor population flows and needs for those communities gathered in camps (ibid). Furthermore, the government also believes that the crowded camps will draw international attention to the refugee population’s needs and this will encourage direct funding from international organisations (ibid).

Another issue is the flow of funds from the international community for humanitarian assistance into Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): ‘In early 2013, the U.S. Government supplied the Government of Iraq in Baghdad with USD 45 million to offset the cost of hosting the refugees. This money should have been distributed to the appropriate authorities, namely the KRG. However, despite 97% of the Syrian refugees in Iraq remaining in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), Baghdad transferred a mere seven million USD to the KRG (KRG, 2014a). This example in part explains the deficit of funds and subsequent limited infrastructure for refugee education, even more conspicuous at the secondary level. Overall, Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)’s formal education systems cannot currently absorb educational demand leaving refugee youth in both camp and non-campus settings with limited or no opportunity to study (UNESCO, 2013c).

The curriculum has been a complicated issue in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). Initially, when the camp schools started, the Arabic version of the KRG curriculum was
used, which is certified and accredited. Quickly the government experienced a budgetary crisis realising that it could not cover costs owing to the increase in teachers’ salaries and printing costs. During the last academic year, 2013-2014, in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), refugee students enrolled in refugee schools in the camps to study the KRG curriculum with Kurdish as the language of instruction. This language barrier meant that refugee students struggled. They had previously studied in the Arabic language, using Kurdish language in the home rather than in school. The transition between languages of instruction created difficulties in communication and threatened meaningful learning in the classroom. A key factor in curriculum choice is certification. In following the KRG curriculum, refugee students who complete secondary school in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) will receive certification and accreditation from KRG (Interview KINT06, 2014).

In Domiz camp students can choose to study either the KRG curriculum in Arabic or the Syrian curriculum, however certification for the latter is more challenging, as it requires students to travel back to Syria to sit final examinations and attain accreditation. While there are students who will opt for the Syrian curriculum regardless, in general the students’ main goal is to obtain an approved, recognised certificate (Interview KINT11, 2014). A third curriculum option emerged in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), the National Coalition for Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces (NCS). Syrian opposition requested that the opposition curriculum be rolled out in Kurdish schools. The NCS amended the existing Syrian curriculum that was accredited, printed and distributed it across the region. The KRG accepted these materials and immediately put them in the camp schools (Interviews KINT10 and KINT06, 2014).

In terms of NFE, local and international NGOs run youth-friendly spaces (YFS) in camps and urban settings to serve those young people out of schooling and to facilitate transition back to formal education (Save the Children, 2013; UNHCR, 2014). Initiatives to provide adolescents with TVET, life skills and entrepreneurship training are ongoing (UNHCR, 2014a). Business and life skills trainings are linked to the camp economies with business start-ups aiming to create more shops, transportation facilities, bakeries and hatcheries (Ibid). Young people living in Domiz camp revealed an interest in non-formal education (NFE) courses related to the computing and hairdressing as well as more recreational opportunities (FGD KFG01, 2014).

Gaps in refugee youth education provision
The Kurdish authorities and various international and local NGOs have been considerably active in the field of education. However, the education situation ‘is fairly dire, access is limited and quality of education is low’ (Interview KINT09, 2014). Language of Instruction is the major issue affecting educational access for refugee young people in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). The aforementioned Arabic schools are too few and over-crowded creating a substantial challenge in terms of physical access (Interview KINT13, 2014). Kurdish refugees from Syria previously studied in Arabic whereas in the home many communicate in their mother tongue, North Kurdish or Kurmanji.

In Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), the dominant variant of Kurdish is a different dialect – the South Kurdish or Sorani dialect. While the languages are similar a Kurmanji speaker might initially struggle to learn in the Sorani dialect without preparatory language classes. This issue of language preventing learning is highlighted in Daratu, a suburb of Erbil, where none of the 220 students who attend the non-formal activities offered by the NGO Triangle attend formal schooling. The reason is simply because they view the Sorani language used in the public schools as a barrier to learning. In addition to difficulties in being
able to follow the Kurdish language classes, refugees prefer to learn in Arabic believing that certification will be regarded as more valid upon their return to Syria.

Generally, schools in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) were overcrowded before the refugee influx, so while demand has been growing, supply has not been able to match it. The lack of secondary schools in the camps is among the main gaps in Kurdistan’s refugee youth education. Aside from Domiz camp, no other refugee camps have secondary schools. This deprives the majority of camp-based young refugees from having access to formal secondary schooling. Furthermore, existing schools in the camps suffer from a lack of basic WASH facilities and consistent electricity supply.

Tented classrooms remain the norm for refugee students in camps and suburban settings (KFG01 2014 and KFG04 2014). This makes the schools far from comfortable both in the long hot summers and bitterly cold winters. One teacher described classroom conditions: ‘They cannot learn or think when they are cold, when they lack a playground during the breaks. We have exams coming in January; I doubt they would be able to write anything in the cold’ (Abdulfatah, 2013). As a result of the lack of basic facilities in refugee camp schools, students drop out from formal education (Interview KINT17, 2014).

From interviews it emerged that insufficient funds for humanitarian assistance prevent INGOs, local NGOs and government authorities from being able to fully develop quality refugee education services. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) experienced ruptured economic flows in early 2014 following political tensions between Baghdad and Erbil. This resulted in a delay in teachers’ salary payments, forcing some teachers to leave their positions and seek alternative employment (Interview KINT09, 2014). This loss of teaching staff led to some schools closing, diminishing teaching capacity and quality in public schools. Any improvement in the economic situation of Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) hinges both on its political future and how disputes between KRG and the Iraqi central government administrations are handled.

Another economic issue derives from the way international funds are distributed both in Iraq and regionally among NGOs. It is argued that the lack of international funding for the Syrian response in Iraq is a major issue. Donors tend to prioritise Jordan and Lebanon with these two countries receiving the majority of the funds (Interview KINT07, 2014). Even in Iraq the funds go to the central government and limited funds reach Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) where the majority of the refugees are settled. In addition to this, reduced funds have been allocated to KRG due to claims that the government has sufficient resources to respond to refugee needs (Interview KINT05, 2014).

In all the interviews conducted, economic deprivation lies at the root of educational exclusion and limited educational quality. Poverty has a negative impact on access and quality education for refugee youth in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). The economic hardships faced by refugee families force young family members to work instead of entering education or training. Bearing in mind the traditional family structure the young members, especially young men, must fulfil their foremost duty and support the family by taking on roles of responsibility such as paid work (Interview KINT14, 2014). During an FGD, a young boy said very seriously and somewhat sadly, ‘If I go to school who will support my family?’ (FGD KFG01, 2014). A mother of three school age daughters and one son (all out of school), said she couldn’t afford to send her son to school even if schools were available; ‘My husband can’t work; he was a political prisoner for 11 years, if I send my son to school, who is going to support the family?’ (FGDs KFG03, 2014). A female participant explained that she did not go
to school because her mother was ill which required her to stay at home and care for the family (FGDs KFG04, 2014).

Essentially, social support networks are lacking to assist vulnerable families and allow young people to access education. Most of the participants in the FGD at Domiz camp expressed considerable economic pressure and hopelessness about the future. These young people saw no reason to pursue education having little hope of a future job or further education opportunities. This was illustrated by a boy who said, 'I don’t like to study, how can I like it when I see someone [who] graduated from high school but works in construction?' (FGD KFG04, 2014).

A discussion in one FGD demonstrates how young refugees felt in limbo in their current situation in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)(FGD KFG02, 2014). They discussed how in the beginning they believed they would only stay for a couple of months but they now feel that their stay is long-term with no end in sight to the Syrian conflict. When the young participants were asked how they would like to see themselves, or what they would like to become in the future, none of the participants had a clear view. The only exception was a young boy who said that he wanted to be a barber (FGDs KFG01; KFG02; KFG03 and KFG04, 2014).

In Duhok, the province hosting Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)’s largest refugee camp Domiz, Kurmanji is the main spoken dialect of Kurdish. This is advantageous for Kurdish refugees from Syria, the majority of whom speak Kurmanji. However, refugee youth might be unfamiliar with the written form of the Kurmanji dialect and are accustomed to learning in Arabic. As a result, Kurdish students, in spite of speaking Kurmanji in the home, struggle to learn in this language. For this reason, Arabic is the preferred language of instruction in Duhok.

An additional issue related to these dialect differences is that parents are often unable to help their children with homework having themselves studied in the Arabic language. Arabic schools are subsequently over-subscribed by refugee students throughout Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). Spaces in schools where Arabic is the language of instruction are in high demand, even more so with the recent arrival of many IDPs from areas of Iraq to Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)’s city and rural areas.

Choosing a curriculum for refugee students has been at the centre of the education debate in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). The decision of whether to teach the host country’s curriculum, adopt the Syrian curriculum or the Syrian opposition curriculum (NCS) received much speculation and is intertwined with notions of identity and hopes for the future (Interview KINT05, 2014). Those who are against the host country’s curriculum argue that they should use their own country’s curriculum, as it is what they will need upon return to Syria. Certain refugee communities prefer that children and youth follow the NCS curriculum rather than the curriculum of the Syria government.

However, KRG cannot currently accredit the Syrian curricula (Interview KINT11, 2014). The varied choice in curricula and queries over certification and accreditation lead to misunderstandings and lack of access and progression through education systems. For example, among the refugees in Domiz camp, rumours circulated that formal education certificates from Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) would not be accepted upon return to Syria: ‘People here say even if we graduate and receive our certificate, we can’t go nowhere because the camp certificate is useless’ one participant said (FGD KFG03, 2014). This
resulted in refugee youth dropping out of school (Interview KINT14, 2014). Easily accessible, clear and up-to-date information on education services would address these misunderstandings and promote education attendance of refugee youth.

In addition to formal education, there are a number of NGOs providing NFE services to refugee youth. Young people who had been out of school for a year or more said they were unwilling to return to formal education to learn alongside younger students (Interview KINT13, 2014). Their priority is to find paid work, to step into a position of responsibility for their family and community (FGDs KFG01 and KFG03, 2014). Notably, none of the young people had approached organisations offering these services. In Sulaymaniah FG, most refugee youth had already benefited from livelihoods training and TVET with Mercy Corps. However, NFE faces some challenges in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI).

Among the main challenges is that participants are not convinced that these interventions can improve future prospects and this can jeopardise retention rates. Also, due to financial pressures parents prefer their young people to gain paid employment rather than attend education programmes that are unaccredited even if they offer skills linked to the labour market. The question of onward progression for young people in non-formal education is key and linked to engagement and retention of refugee youth (Interview KINT11, 2014).

Good practices in refugee youth education provision
Despite the dearth of resources and subsequent challenges in refugee youth quality education provision in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), there are considerable initiatives and good practices that can potentially be scaled up. A number of international and local organisations work intensively to overcome existing obstacles to education for refugee children and youth. The section below outlines some of the significant projects and strategies implemented to promote the provision of quality education.

Regarding physical education access, the need for more secondary schools across Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) is critical. Despite the economic challenges, there are certain endeavours to open secondary schools for the coming academic year 2014-2015 in Darshakran and Kawergosk camps (Interview KINT04 2014). Approximately 550 Syrian teachers received training during summer 2014 to prepare for the forthcoming academic year (ibid). Barzani Charity Foundation and Rwanga Organisation instigated construction of schools and other learning facilities such as CFS and YFS that have proven effective in providing children and young people with safe spaces to congregate, learn and take time away from the pressures that often face families forced to migrate (Interview KINT01, 2014).

When refugee youth first arrive it can be challenging to adjust to a new environment. Their routine of attending school is often disrupted for a variety of social, physical and emotional reasons, which can have negative effects on their well-being. It is crucial to give young people hope and the motivation to re-enter education and training. One of many initiatives motivating youth to go back to schools has been taken by UNHCR who coordinate a back to school campaign in Duhok. Similarly, the Norwegian Refugee Council runs a project to encourage young refugees to go back to school by running a modified and extended programme, ‘School Support Improvement and Community Building’, which aims to motivate more people to return to school.

There are some NGOs that offer Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). Taking into consideration the fact that young people work in order to support their families, the importance of training courses linked to
labour market skills is clear. Mercy Corps targets the 18 to 25 age group offering training in skills such as English and the Sorani language as well as computer training. For graduates of TVET courses, Mercy Corps runs a programme offering grants to start businesses. The organisation’s main area of work is Sulaymaniyah but this could be expanded across Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) to benefit more refugee youth (Interview KINT12, 2014).

The Norwegian Refugee Council’s youth programming offers TVET and provides support to establish small businesses. A formal technical qualification is offered to those who complete the training. In terms of livelihood support, the NGO Reach, also operating in the Sulaymaniyah area, helps refugee youth to find employment. The organisation has a job centre that registers refugees, keeps CVs on file and assists in job matching (Interview KINT08, 2014).

Other TVET courses on offer in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) include sewing courses, IT courses, and language courses in English and Arabic as well as UNFPA’s programme, peer-to-peer education, which offers training in life skills and social cultural initiatives for young people (Interviews KINT16; KINT15 2014). Another example of good practice in NFE and TVET is the Barzani Charity Foundation which offers musical courses for refugee youth. A small but significant impact of this programme was that two graduates found paid work as musicians playing at weddings (Interview KINT03, 2014). This case study demonstrates the potential for apparently recreational activities to enhance future prospects for young refugees.

To address linguistic barriers to formal schooling, NGOs offer courses in Sorani Kurdish. These language initiatives can be expanded to enable more students to integrate and communicate in the Sorani language. For younger children this may even allow them to join formal schooling at a later stage, where Sorani is the language of instruction. The expansion of Arabic as the language of instruction for students following the KRG curriculum in the forthcoming academic year is a significant practice, showing flexibility and responsiveness from the education authorities.

Cash assistance to overcome financial constraints to education is highly effective. The manager of Daratu Learning Centre, which belongs to the Jord/Judy Organisation for Relief and Development, explained that besides offering teaching in Arabic, which really attracts refugee students to her centre, they also provide textbooks, uniforms, stationery and transportation (Interview KINT13, 2014). These resources have proved a major factor in the centre’s success. Similarly, the Syrian Kurdish Refugee Council in Sulaymaniyah offers cash assistance to students and their families to help cover educational costs such as uniforms, stationery, transportation and food. This is effective in enabling young people to continue their studies (Interview KINT17, 2014). If such systems were expanded for all NFE and formal education initiatives, there would likely be increased educational inclusion of refugee youth.

One of the main challenges in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) is covering the cost of teacher salaries, with reports that some Syrian teachers’ salaries in Domiz camp have not been paid for 8 months (FGD KFG01, 2014). As the director of KRG’s Education Emergency team at the Ministry of Education explained, the government is only able to pay teacher salaries up to December 2014 (Interview KINT04, 2014). It is not clear how teachers’ salaries will be paid after this date. The NGO Triangle proposed to UNICEF that they should ensure teacher salaries for the schools, in the government’s stead. This move for UN agencies, or NGOs, to pay teachers’ salaries and education costs raises the issue of sustainability, with funding secured for allocated periods only and rarely on an ongoing basis.
Construction of secondary schools is underway in Darshakran and Kawergosk refugee camps; however, as the government cannot pay the teachers’ salaries, these schools have not yet begun to accept students. By providing teacher salaries these schools will be able to operate. For teachers in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) schools, the Barzani Organisation offers in-service teacher training to give teachers skills on working with traumatised children and those with special needs (Interview KINT03, 2014). Such training could be expanded to involve refugee and host community teachers, particularly in light of the recent turmoil and forced migration taking place in Iraq and having an impact on Kurdistan.

The establishment of an Education Working Group (EWG) is an important initiative that can bring together the different involved forces in running education in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) more effectively. The fact that there are many education providers emphasises that coordination is critical to avoid duplication and to ensure that refugee communities are advised about the services available. The EWG holds regular meetings every two weeks. (Interview KINT02, 2014) In order to make EWG more effective one can think of a monthly newsletter in Kurdish dialects, Arabic and English to update the various organisations involved and the refugee communities about the education services. Good communication between education providers is integral to coordination (Interview KINT10, 2014).

**Turkey**

The first group of Syrian refugees entered Turkey on 29 April 2011. The Government declared an open border policy on the same day and reiterated its commitment to the principle of non-refoulement[^37]. The government officially refers to Syrian refugees as ‘persons under temporary protection’. This is based on Article 91 of the new asylum law of Turkey, the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, adopted in April 2013 and entered into force in April 2014[^38].

The legal framework in Turkey provides a suitable working environment for state authorities to address the challenges in the sector of refugee youth education. Above all, Turkey, as opposed to Jordan and Lebanon, is a state party to the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The Law on Foreigners and International Protection: Article 89 states that, ‘the Applicant or a person who has gained the status of international protection and his/her family members shall benefit from the services of primary and secondary education’ (the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, Article 89).

According to the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), as of 18 July 2014, the total number of Syrian refugees living either in camps or outside camps was 1.3 million (AFAD, 2013). Of this number, 218,847 are living in 22 camps in ten provinces

[^37]: “The principle of non-refoulement is the cornerstone of asylum and of international refugee law. Following from the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution, as set forth in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, this principle reflects the commitment of the international community to ensure for all their enjoyment of human rights, including the rights to life, freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and to liberty and security of person. These and other rights are threatened when a refugee is returned to persecution or danger” (UNHCR 1997).

[^38]: The Law on Foreigners and International Protection (Official Gazette, 2013).
bordering Syria. The rest are self-settled refugees living in urban areas and small villages. Refugee communities are reportedly spread out throughout Turkey’s 81 provinces. Economic difficulties and increasing tensions with the host communities in Southern Turkey, where a high number of Syrians are self-settled, provoked a secondary movement and forced many refugee families to move to urban areas such as Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara.

Officially, the open door policy is in force but in practice Turkey tries to control entry and channel assistance to the makeshift camps on the Syrian side. ‘The Government maintains an open border policy for persons fleeing the conflict. However, the admission of Syrians without passports at official border crossings is generally linked to the availability of places within the camps, with exceptions, e.g. for those requiring emergency medical treatment’ (UNHCR 2014, p.5). The Government of Turkey foresees a total of 1.5 million Syrians in the country by the end of December 2014.

From the perspective of the refugee communities residing in Turkey, whilst expressing gratitude and appreciation towards Turkey, there is a sense of instability and temporality among Syrian youth and their parents. A mother of a 14-year-old FGD participant told researchers: ‘we are hearing that they [Turkish authorities] are tightening all the procedures against Syrians as an attempt to eventually make us leave the country’ (FGD TFG02, 2014). Male participants (18-25 years old) mentioned that onward migration is the option for many. One 22-year-old participant said:

_The problem in Turkey that there is no stability, you never know when they will say good bye to you. [...] My two friends for example who used to work for INGOs, they were aware that once the funding is over and the mandate of this INGO is over they will be over as well. So now they are both in Greece (FGD TFG3, 2014)._ 

‘Migration is easy but it takes time. There are known gangs facilitating it’, as another participant put it.

All FGD participants have heard first-hand stories from young Syrians smuggled to European countries like Germany and Sweden. They explained the different methods of migrating illegally and cited numbers ranging from 6,000 euros for smuggling by boat from Izmir to Athens, to 10,000 euros for fake passports and arranged flights from Istanbul airport (ibid). A 21-year-old FGD participant explained: ‘All the embassies are denying visas for Syrians and this is the reason that pushed many young Syrian men to think of migration and risk their life’ (FGD TFG3, 2014). Three participants said they would go back to Syria if the situation improves, and others said onward migration would be an option when they acquire the necessary funds.

These young people are unable to plan for their future. When asked ‘what would you like to change in your lives?’ a 22-year old-answered, ‘We want to keep it as it is, to fix it. We are afraid we will lose what we have now’ (FGD TFG3, 2014). With respect to long-term plans, only one participant mentioned his plans to remain in Turkey because his father has his private business here. This demonstrates the impact securing a livelihood can have in instilling a sense of belonging in the host country for refugee communities.

Overall, Syrians are believed to be much more comfortable in Turkey than they are in Lebanon or Jordan. However, within Turkey the situation between Istanbul and Ankara for example varies from the situation in Hatay or Kilis. Displaced Syrians in Istanbul are likely to have better access to financial resources and may feel more removed from the conflict.
compared with Syrians living in south-eastern border cities. (Interview TINT13, 2014). Living in cities close to the borders implies frequent movement in and out of Syria, as households are constantly receiving new arrivals from Syria and one household could easily be a host to four or five families as one of the teachers described the case for several students who complain about insufficient space or time at home to study (Interview TINT05, 2014).

Furthermore, Syrian students and teachers in the south report ease of mobility into Syria, as many go and visit their families during their vacations (Interview TINT04; FGD TFG02, 2014). Difficulties for children and young people to continue their education arise as families in south-eastern cities are constantly on the move, making it problematic for schools to accept students at different stages of the academic year (Interview TINT06, 2014). Therefore, there is a need to design education interventions that are responsive to the different circumstances and expectations between Syrians living in different parts of Turkey.

**Demand for refugee youth education provision**

Evidence gathered from FGDs and interviews with experts and practitioners indicate there is a strong demand for all types of education among the refugee community in Turkey. The government, supported by international organisations is making efforts to address this demand.

Refugee parents are torn because they want their children to learn and secure a better future but adults tend to struggle to find work; it is easier for adolescents to find paid work in Turkey. Moreover, should adults be able to get a job, they have to confront the legal aspect of securing a work permit, yet there appears to be no coherent process for Syrians to apply for work permits (International Crisis Group, 2014). As a result, many young refugees work rather than study (Interview TINT01, 2014). Adolescents are working in small businesses, tailoring, textiles, restaurants and shoe making factories. A male FGD participant aged 13 described his day at work: ‘I worked in a bazaar and coffee shop. In the bazaar, I worked from 5am until 9pm. At 5 am we start unloading the goods. I had half an hour for lunch break’. A female FGD participant aged 14 tried to work at a hairdresser’s but didn’t continue: ‘I went there for half an hour, I couldn’t bear more. She humiliated me so I told her I am going out to buy something and never came back’ (FGD TFG2, 2014).

Economic needs also burden teachers who do not have a stable income. ‘Depending on the donor, teachers’ salaries might come in for one month and stop for three consecutive months, which means teachers are often anxious and looking for other jobs’ (Interview TINT06, 2014). Furthermore, there are not enough schools to meet demand. In Gaziantep province, there are 12 non-camp, community-run Syrian schools for the total population of 172,155 self-settled Syrian refugees (Interview TINT10, 2014; UNHCR 2014g). Educators report that there are a couple of hundred students on waiting lists for the younger grades. Both in Konya and Kirikhan, for example, the Syrian schools were shut down due to lack of funds (Interviews TINT02; TINT11, 2014). Several schools reported that they are threatened with closure if funding is not secured for the new school year (Interviews TINT04; TINT05, 2014).

For Syrians who are already working and not willing to go back to school, there is a need to prepare them to enter the job market whether in Turkey or when they return to Syria. TVET is the biggest gap according to an EEAS representative in Turkey: ‘What you need to do now is to train not only doctors or engineers, or academics. You have to train everything to start the country again; you need irrigation specialists, maintenance specialists, you need sociologists. You need people to take care of children after the war, etc.’ (Interview TINT12, 2014).
Male participants believe that vocational training centres are amongst the biggest needs for young refugees who are of their age. One participant mentioned that he is receiving training in a textile factory as a result of personal connections there. This model could be extended and partnerships with private business could be formed for similar trainings for Syrian youth (FGD TFG03, 2014). However, TVET needs to be carefully designed in such settings as it could be expensive and not necessarily guarantee employment if it is not tied to realistic needs in the job market (Interview TINT14, 2014).

Male participants aged 11-14 wanted to have computers and computer classes at school (FGD TFG02, 2014). All participants mentioned that they have access to the Internet and laptops in their homes. They share the Internet subscription with their neighbours and pay around 25 TL (USD 11) per month. Participants mentioned that they use the Internet once or twice per day for reasons related to study and homework, but other than that they use it mainly to get news and stay in contact with relatives in Syria. In general, there is a strong interest in free computer literacy programmes from different age groups given the importance of basic Information Communication Technology (ICT) knowledge and scarcity of available opportunities to learn ICT skills.

There is a recurring need is for Turkish language training, so that refugee youth and children can attend education providers where Turkish is the language of instruction. Although international laws and best practices say that people should have the right to study in their mother tongue, the need for refugees to learn Turkish would expand access to education for refugee children and youth (INEE, 2009). Currently, refugee communities cannot access literacy and language classes that are provided for Turks (Interview TINT01, 2014). Special literacy programmes and remedial classes are of extreme urgency as well, as some students who have been out of school for three years reported that they have forgotten how to read and write (Interview TINT01, 2014). Most of the community-run Syrian schools replaced French with the Turkish language while keeping English as the main foreign language for pupils to learn (Interviews TINT04; TINT05; TINT06, 2014; FGDs TFG02, 2014).

Children and young people often suffer from constant anxiety and a sense of instability due to difficult circumstances in the home. There is limited space to release this stress as most schools are located in residential buildings that do not provide yards or playgrounds. Schools cannot afford to take students to nearby playgrounds nor to pay for the extra rent expenses. During breaks, boys tend to go out to the street while girls stay in the classrooms (Interview TINT06; FGD TFG02, 2014). Extra-curricular school activities and summer vacations are limited to Qur’an study and other religious activities such as open-air festivals where refugee children and youth can sing religious songs (FGD TFG02, 2014).

Cases where several families live together create added stress for the students: ‘One of the students told us she lives with two other families, she can only find space in the bathroom to study’ (Interview TINT05, 2014). A centre for children with special needs in Antakya reported that they deal with students who suffer from severe psychological disorders presenting symptoms such as panic attacks, hysterical laughing seizures and different types of aggressive behaviour like biting (Interview TINT07, 2014). Unfortunately, psychosocial and psychological interventions are limited in scope and effect as most of the INGOs are running leisure activities and calling it psychosocial support, while the traumatised populations are in need of targeted psychosocial support where refugee children and youth can talk through their experiences and worries as needed and then be referred on to professional mental health specialists (Interview TINT11, 2014).
Supply of refugee youth education provision

Turkey has established an administrative structure supervised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which manages several aspects of the Syrian refugee crisis. AFAD, the Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency of Turkey, has been tasked with coordinating all relief efforts in the camps. AFAD is directly under the Prime Minister’s Office. The Ministry of Education is increasingly becoming involved in primary and secondary education issues both within and outside the camps. The General Directorate on Migration Management, GDMM, is supposed to assume the lead role in all asylum related issues as of April 2014. The Presidency for Turks Living Abroad and Relative Communities covers tuition fees and provides scholarships for Syrian refugee youth attending universities.

TÖMER is the affiliated language institution of Ankara University, which provides Turkish courses to foreigners and provides language courses in many languages. TÖMER’s branch school in Gaziantep is reportedly working with the Gaziantep University which currently has 313 Syrian students. It offers Turkish language courses for Syrians to enable them to get higher grades at the entry exams at a discounted fee. ‘However, the other TÖMER branches in other cities are not so generous, they charge regular fees for Syrians, which is difficult for many of the refugee youth to pay’ (Interview TINT17, 2014).

A number of UN agencies provide support and assistance to host communities where Syrians are residing, as well as limited initiatives in selected camps (See Annex 1 for a comprehensive list). At the moment fewer than 20 INGOs have managed to register with the authorities. A limited number of national NGOs are active in education. The Syrian Interim Government, present in Gaziantep, plays an important role in collecting and grading baccalaureate exams, issuing baccalaureate certificates, distributing textbooks, and other education-related issues.

A UNICEF Official in Gaziantep explained that they operated according to three modalities: education in the camps; education outside the camps (i.e. Syrian community-run schools); and education in Turkish schools (Interview TINT18, 2014). The officer said that the former schools in the camps follow the Syrian curriculum. This is also the case for schools run by the Syrian community, NGOs/INGOs and with the support of international organisations as well as some municipalities in the south-eastern region. The third modality for the Ministry of National Education is to integrate Syrian refugee youth into Turkish schools that follow the Turkish curriculum.

AFAD and the Ministry of National Education supervise refugee education in Turkey’s camps. UNHCR and UNICEF support the government to deliver camp education. NGOs and INGOS are not permitted to operate in Turkey’s refugee camps in line with government policy and are therefore not involved in camp education provision. AFAD’s website states that as at 18 July 2014, a total of 68,638 Syrian students were being educated in 850 classrooms in the Turkey’s refugee camps (AFAD, 2014). The table below provides a breakdown of students within each camp:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>No. of Camps</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Number of Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adana</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11,102</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adıyaman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10,024</td>
<td>3,291 (390 preschool)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaziantep</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33,222</td>
<td>7,904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hatay</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14,724</td>
<td>4,965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kahramanmaşaş</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16,927</td>
<td>4,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilis</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>37,418</td>
<td>11,195</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8: Breakdown of school aged refugees in Turkey’s refugee camps

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malatya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7,549</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mardin</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8,103</td>
<td>No school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osmaniye</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9,051</td>
<td>2,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Şanlıurfa</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>70,827</td>
<td>14,459 in 3 camps</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Selman Işık from the Ministry of National Education explained that 90 percent of refugee children in the camps (totalling 70,000 which more or less ties in with AFAD data) attend elementary education (Interview TINT17, 2014). UNHCR makes a lower estimation for the academic year 2012-2013, stating the average enrolment rate for children, both boys and girls, in primary schools in Turkey’s camps is 60% (UNHCR, 2014b).

There is no official breakdown between pre-school, primary school and secondary school education in Turkey’s camps but in interviews it was confirmed that camp formal education covers mainly preschool and primary schools, omitting secondary level formal education. In the absence of secondary schools in the camps, vocational training courses and extracurricular activities attract refugee youth. These NFE courses offer a wide-range of subjects, including Turkish language courses, hairdressing, carpet weaving and Qur'an courses:

*We opened with UNICEF, ten vocational education centres in the camps. A total of 30,000 Syrian youth received training in these schools. At the moment, 12 girls are learning tailoring, ready-made clothing, sewing, weaving, and needlework. The girls who attend these courses produce things and sell them and make good money (Interview TINT17, 2014).*

In another interview, it was stated emphatically that ‘secondary education does not exist in the camps’, in Gaziantep (Interview TINT02, 2014).

UNICEF has established Child Friendly Spaces staffed by trained youth workers and volunteers, facilitating recreational, sports and educational activities with over 7,500 young people in 17 camps (UNHCR 2014b). There are no similar, youth-friendly spaces in the camps. This lack of youth-friendly spaces is partly compensated by non-formal, vocational training and learning activities. UNHCR-supported existing vocational training centres operate inside the camps by providing much needed resources. This support ensured continuity of the projects aiming at building the capacity of refugees and strengthening self-reliance (*ibid*). UNHCR also called for the inclusion of men and women in such programmes, helping to establish an activity targeted at male refugees in one camp.

In order to improve the quality of education, UNICEF prepared educational guidelines in Turkish in January 2014. Teacher training courses were organised for 2,750 Syrian volunteer teachers. These courses aimed to teach INEE’s minimum teaching standards (INEE, 2009). UNICEF also organised host community teacher training courses in six schools in Adana, Şanlıurfa and Mardin, reaching 107 teachers and providing books and materials for schools and funds monthly financial incentives for Syrian teachers (USD 150).

The percentage of refugee children from Syria attending school, especially in urban areas, is low. For self-settled Syrian refugee communities in Southern Turkey, local governorates, municipalities and NGOs/INGOs as well as community groups are organizing formal and non-formal education activities. It can be argued that Syrian students need to be integrated into the national education system, as this is the most sustainable, especially as the Syrian crisis has created a protracted refugee situation that is expected to run for an unknown number of years. Although obligated by a robust legal framework to take in Syrian students
even as ‘listeners’ should they not master the Turkish language, several Turkish public schools in Gaziantep showed resistance to accepting Syrian children, as reported by a Syrian parent who could not register her children in a public school. She then turned to the local community-run Syrian school but it had reached its full capacity. The family were thus left with no option but to keep the children (eight and 12 years old) at home.

The Ministry of Education, together with UNICEF, provides both formal education services following the Syrian curriculum, and NFE via People’s Education Centres (*Halk Eğitim Merkezleri*) in cities. There were free public vocational training institutions created by the Ministry of National Education in provinces for Turkish citizens long before the Syrian humanitarian crisis erupted. Turkish language courses operate for urban and camp refugee students. TÖMER, the Ankara University affiliated group of language schools, is gaining increased importance in the face of growing demand to learn Turkish. TÖMER has given Turkish courses to some 3,000 students.

Community-based education (CBE) in Turkey teaches either the curriculum issued by the Syrian Commission of Education and accredited by the Syrian Interim Ministry of Education (IMOE) or the Libyan curriculum which is often taught in 9th and 12th grade. Supplementary Islamic textbooks are common in south-eastern Turkey, especially in the absence of an authority to control or monitor the curriculum. As one teacher explained:

*In Syria, we had more constraints concerning the topics we can discuss with students, like politics for example. Here, we are free to direct the student’s attention in whatever direction. For example, we were not free to discuss religion before, but now we are free to teach the student all the issues concerning religion. In addition, we teach Qur’an and Tajwid*39 (Interview TINT04, 2014).

Some schools have found ways to overcome the dilemma and confusion over which curricula to follow. The Sharia High School in Antakya, for example, overcomes this problem by teaching multiple curricula. It teaches, in addition to the Syrian curriculum offered by Syrian Education Commission, the Sharia curriculum that was taught in Sharia schools in Syria, as well as Turkish and English languages (Interview TINT05, 2014). Additionally, some schools are applying their own modifications to textbooks and printing their own, edited teaching material.

As most of the Syrian schools are funded by individual businessmen or philanthropists from Syria, Turkey or the Gulf countries. One interviewee explained:

*…each donor comes with his own ideological or political agenda […] each school now has its own orientation: Secular, Salafist, or fundamentalist, etc. We would like to see the IMOE taking over and exercising control over these different agendas to save the schools from donors’ manipulation’* (Interview TINT06, 2014).

Conditional funding poses another significant challenge such as imposing the recruitment of teachers lacking adequate qualifications (Interview TINT02, 2014).

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39*Tajwid* means elocution, the rules of pronunciation during Qur’an recitation.  
40 Learning to read and memorise the Islamic holy book Qur’an for the children at younger age in private courses is both a religio-culturally valuable tradition and a way leading to a profession thorough more advanced religious education.
The adoption of a revised Syrian curriculum, following authorisation from the government, has expanded access and sustainability of education for refugee students in Turkey (UNHCR 2014b). UNICEF is currently discussing short and long-term solutions for the recognition and certification of learning achievements with the Ministry of Education. In 2014, with regard to sitting official examinations to receive accredited certification for studies, around 7,000 students took the official Libyan exam and 9,500 students sat the Syrian baccalaureate exam of the IMOE, an increase from 2013 when 6,000 students sat the official IMOE exam (Interview TINT10, 2014). Therefore, there are a total of 20,000 students who have sat examinations to attain certification but the extent to which each certificate is valued is arguable.

There is considerable confusion over which certificates are accredited and by which educational authority. Refugee students are keen to get the Turkish Universities accreditation of the Syrian baccalaureate certificates issued by the IMOE. Libyan certificates that are issued by the Libyan Ministry of Education through a designated committee based in Turkey are not officially accredited by the Turkish government although there have been some very few cases where Syrian students with the Libyan baccalaureate certificate were accepted in Turkish private universities (FGD TFG01, 2014). The accreditation issue is not limited to the baccalaureate level and efforts should be made by educational authorities to recognise foreign accredited certification and to subsequently facilitate access to primary and secondary formal education (Interview TINT16, 2014).

There are instances of Syrian students sitting for two exams: for the Libyan curriculum and the IMOE curriculum. In some cases students sat for Syrian government exam in areas under the government control and then took the exam of the IMOE due to uncertain recognition status of both and lack of information about eligibility criteria at various universities (Interview TINT05, 2014). The political connotations that come with following the IMOE curriculum is another issue. One parent reported that he chose the Libyan curriculum for his children to avoid having a certificate issued by the IMOE, as he is not ready to bear the consequences of this sort of ‘political game’. Fearing political changes in the region, some actors are stressing the importance of de-politicizing support for Syrians’ education in Turkey (Interview TINT13, 2014). In an effort to remain neutral and impartial, UN agencies and the majority of INGOs defer from coordinating or starting a dialogue with the IMOE (Interview TINT10, 2014).

**Gaps in refugee youth education provision**

Most of the gaps mentioned in the literature, during the interviews with practitioners and in FGDs point to the ‘temporary character’ of Turkey’s asylum system as the main cause preventing widespread refugee youth education access. The geographical limitation maintained by Turkey with regards to the 1951 Refugee Convention for decades left the country unprepared in the sense of integration. Any refugee integration scheme was not previously considered. Therefore, Turkey has not yet developed a comprehensive education project for refugee children and refugee youth. The absence of a legal framework leads to a lack of administrative clarity.

There is no designated authority for overall management of non-camp refugee communities. The 2014 RRP says that the Syrian refugee response in Turkey is managed by the Government through AFAD, in collaboration with UNHCR and other UN agencies. It describes the management of the crisis as being coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the operational leadership of AFAD. However, AFAD is not involved in assisting non-camp refugees. UNHCR and other UN agencies therefore spared no efforts in maintaining good
relations with AFAD. This is why the gradual growth of the non-camp population went unnoticed during the first three years.

The interviews with the MOE, UNICEF and the Presidency of Turks Living Abroad and Relative Communities indicate that they are increasingly pulled into the education sector for Syrian refugees. For the non-camp population, the MOE is now increasingly taking a leading role in this sector. However the main coordination unit under this ministry is manned only by one expert under an undersecretary and two aids seconded by the ministry of EU affairs. The Ministry of Education is organizing regular meetings with UNICEF and UNHCR.

The practical implication of a lack of coherent refugee education policy is demonstrated by the fact that Turkish schools require students enrolling to have an identification number issued by Turkish authorities. As described by FGD participants, it is common for students of secondary school age to register with Syrian community-run schools rather than with Turkish public schools because enrolment is not possible without a valid residency permit (FGD TFG01; TFG02; TFG03, 2014). The growing and urgent need for refugee education at all levels; particularly secondary education in provinces outside Turkey’s border region remains unaddressed. A major obstacle in providing education for refugee youth in these areas is the lack of registration for refugee families. As of the end of July 2014, only an estimated 60% of refugee families were registered. Without full registration of the refugee population, planning education programming is challenging, with the exact number of school-aged refugees unknown.

Furthermore, the significant challenge of recruitment and training of enough Arabic speaking teachers as well as the need to acquire spaces and schools to meet education demand has placed considerable pressure on education providers. Decisions around accreditation of the Syrian curriculum, together with several other logistical and financial problems pushed the Ministry of Education to work on an ambitious plan to enrol Syrian youth in Turkish schools:

The preparations are almost completed. Whether their families are registered or not the Syrian students will be able to enrol [in] our schools. For those who are not yet registered, [we] will create an alternative registration system. For them to be successful, Turkish knowledge is a must. So we will open special Turkish courses. In the absence of certifications and documentations, enrolment will be based on their own testimonies. The type of education in Turkish schools is one of the challenges to attract the Syrian students to our schools (Interview TINT17, 2014).

While NGOs and INGOs are not allowed to operate in Turkey’s refugee camps, a certain number of civil society organisations are running educational projects for self-settled refugee youth, mainly in southern cities. Government relations with NGOs and INGOs are complex and at times strained. NGOs are not permitted to operate in Turkey’s camps, although recently a limited number of INGOs were granted access. Permission to enter the camps was not on the basis of capacity, experience or specialism but rather grounded on Turkey’s perceived national interest of security concerns related to the armed conflict of the past 30 years with Kurds. The Turkish government rejected applications from well-known INGOs on the grounds of past political statements made against Turkish government policies as long as 20 years ago.

Another criterion for registration permission is whether any particular INGO has been operational through a local NGO, without being registered during the last three years of the Syrian humanitarian crisis (Interview TINT18, 2014). UNHCR has underlined this situation in RRP 2014 by saying that:
Unlike previous RRP s which were implemented directly by participating UN agencies, an important feature of this RRP will be the partnering of both national and international NGOs to ensure a rapid response to a significant number of beneficiaries. Since mid-2013 there has been an increase in the number of recognised and accredited NGOs providing assistance to refugees in urban areas. To date two international NGOs, Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and International Medical Corps (IMC) are operational in various locations in the South East of Turkey to assist Syrian refugees. Another eight international NGOs have been registered in Turkey and are exploring possibilities to expand their activities to support the non-camp Syrian refugees as well as affected host communities. In 2014, UN agencies will work closely with these NGOs and others that are accredited to ensure a wider delivery of assistance to all refugees especially those in urban areas (UNHCR 2014b).

This explains why in the Syria Regional Response Plan (RRP), there is no section from INGOs appealing for funds for their projects in Turkey. As a result, Syrian refugee students in the camps cannot benefit from additional funds and expertise from INGOs.

For self-settled refugee communities such as that in Gaziantep insufficient resources have come in, as explained by an INGO worker who stated:

...we haven't seen a lot of assistance coming in to Gaziantep. In general, [as the] international community, I think we failed Gaziantep. To me, it is mind blowing how underserved it is compared to the needs and the numbers that are residing in Gaziantep. There should be more assistance coming to Gaziantep, in terms of all sectors including education (Interview TINT01, 2014).

It would appear therefore that resources are highly limited impeding an adequate refugee education response for a population reaching 1.3 million nationwide.

The main source of statistical information about the Syrian refugees in Turkey is AFAD. However, AFAD is operational only in the camps and is not the managing institution of self-settled refugees outside the camps. Problems in registration and data processing are important issues which result in data gaps. Difficulties include a lack of reliable, detailed data and this creates problems for future planning. The camp population figures are available in AFAD’s data banks, but AFAD does not share data in a timely, organised and categorised manner. No regular breakdowns on age, gender, and educational past are made public. The situation is even problematic with regard to the non-camp population. The main problem for this group is registration: A large part of the Syrian population living outside the camps has not been registered.

As described above, Turkey lacks a general legal framework in relation to refugee protection. The Law of Foreigners and International Protection does not describe the details of the rights and obligations of those persons under temporary protection in Turkey. Only the directive allowing access to free medical treatment at state hospitals successfully regulates health care provision. As regards the education sector, no such legal framework exists. At the moment, an ad hoc approach is applied. An NGO respondent explained:

…this a temporary protection measure which I think started in the 90s, it doesn’t really provide the Syrian refugees security unless the Turkish government approves to put a deadline to it, like if they say there will be under temporary protection for two or three years and after that they will have all the rights, like being able to apply for asylum or them being able to register with UNHCR etc. if they can get these rights after a while it will be a real protective measure (Interview TINT11, 2014).
UNHCR underlines this gap in an indirect way in the 2014 RRP: ‘the legal framework applicable to Syrians will be re-visited in 2014 through a generic Regulation on temporary protection to be adopted as the Council of Ministers Regulation’ (UNHCR 2014b, p. 3).

Another issue regarding refugee education is the lack of coordination and streamlining of the different education curricula. The issue of studying different curricula and sitting for multiple exams stems largely from the lack of access to information and clarity, which in itself is a demoralizing factor for students to enrol in school surrounded by uncertainty (FGD TFG02, 2014). In the absence of an official source of information, Facebook constitutes the main and only source for most refugee youth and their caregivers (FGDs TFG02; TFG03, 2014).

A baccalaureate student FGD participant aged 17 started studying the Syrian curriculum but then, three months after the beginning of the school year, she switched to the Libyan curriculum as she was told that the Syrian certificate is not accredited whereas the Libyan is. FGD participants had little and conflicting understanding of which certificates are accredited, which regulations are applicable, and which services are provided for Syrians (FGD TFG01, 2014). Compared with the good level of information dissemination in the camps, there is an apparent need for more outreach work for Turkey’s urban refugee population (IMC, 2014). Another key concern for self-settled refugee youth is the issue of transportation to and from schools in remote districts. Increased transportation services are needed to ensure access to education providers.

Another identified gap is targeted education services for Former Child Soldiers (FCS), who are among the most neglected groups of refugee youth. To the best of our knowledge at the time of writing this report, no interventions are designed to target FCS. The area is under-researched, yet rumours and unconfirmed reports suggest the number of FCS could be growing. Some teachers and students are going back to Syria to fight. A teacher in a male high school reported:

Students are suffering here as they are thinking what is happening in their country. Many students left the school and went back to jihad. I myself encourage them to go back to Syria, to do whatever they can to serve their country because we know we will be lost if we remain in this situation and I am not the only one who thinks that way here, we all share this revolutionary thinking. We cannot stop the young men at this age, they have an enormous energy and motivation. A few months ago, a student in 11th grade left the school and went back to Syria to fight with the brigades after he had a small argument with his teacher. His father was martyred and his mother came to us seeking help (Interview TINT04, 2014).

This issue is twofold: for FCS, specialised education to address psychosocial issues and to promote re-integration into society is important. In addition, measures could be taken to discuss returning to Syria and the risks entailed.

In summary, despite efforts from the Turkish government, these gaps result in the fact that the demand for education among refugee youth from Syria is not currently met. The lack of a legal framework prevents standardised access to education for all refugee students, stops parents from obtaining work permits and securing livelihoods which in turn forces young people into work rather than study. As the sole breadwinners for their families, many are denied opportunities to continue their education. The limited number of INGOs permitted to operate in refugee camps results in fewer camp services. Furthermore, there remain numerous social issues, such as the need for cash assistance; transportation to education providers; education for children with special needs; proper language training; and
scaling up of successful activities. The following section turns to solutions and outlines some effective initiatives in providing quality education to refugee youth in Turkey.

**Good practice in refugee youth education provision**

While the gaps may be extensive and resources limited in the education sector for Syrian refugee youth, the abundance of local, small-scale initiatives provides hope that solutions can be found by determined idealists.

In the absence of enough school buildings, some municipalities generously provide buildings for Syrian-run education centres and cover the salaries of teachers. A teacher in the Syrian school in Konya cited good practice in this regard (before the school was shut down due to lack of funds):

>(Local) government gave us the building, and they covered some of the salaries, the rest of salaries [were met by] a private donor, Saudi-based Zaid Association. The salaries were very low to the extent that we weren’t able to choose teachers based on merit. Salaries provided by the municipality averaged 800 TL (USD 400) per month. From the private donor, 600 TL (USD 300) (Interview TINT02, 2014).

These efforts in expanding education providers are significant. If their impact is well recorded and communicated to potential donors, additional funds for such centres might be procured. This would allow for a possible increase in salaries, enabling recruitment of experienced teachers to enhance quality.

For Syrian teachers who taught in Syria and now teach in Turkey, some are struck by the comparison in terms of freedom of thought within the Turkish education system:

> The school back in Syria had a very specific objective which is to brainwash the kids through the curriculum that was developed by the education office of the Ba’ath ruling party. The educational policy was set only to brainwash the kids, regardless of any ethical or educational objectives. Here in Turkey, we had more freedom in this regard (Interview TINT02, 2014).

Comparing quality of education received in Gaziantep University to that of the Syrian universities, FGD participants mentioned that university teachers on the whole are professional, respectful and express compassion with them as Syrians. Textbooks and pedagogy in Gaziantep University are of much higher quality than Syrian public universities where some students had started their higher education studies (FGDs TFG01; TFG03, 2014). Exposure to increased freedom of thought could bring positive benefits to students both while in Turkey and upon their return to Syria.

Transportation costs to access education repeatedly arose as an issue, and again some municipalities took the initiative to solve this problem with limited sources. There are certain schools, for example in Antakya, that contribute to school transportation costs. A teacher explained that the school:

> …provide[s] free education and free transportation. Buses are so expensive; there are 12 buses every month with 1300 TL (USD 600) for each. It’s about 60 or 70 thousand US dollars per year, a huge number. The donor started to complain about the transportation fees and he is asking us to ask the parents to share this burden, but we know if we asked the parents many will defer and stop sending their children (Interview TINT05, 2014).
A caregiver FGD participant mentioned that one of her friends told her that she could either feed her child or pay for the transportation, so she stopped sending her child to school (FGD TFG02, 2014).

In an attempt to provide an alternative educational programmes, foster international cooperation, and provide the students with academic and practical knowledge and skills that they can use when they go back home or in their everyday life as professionals, Spark organisation has partnered with Gaziantep University and run winter and summer courses for Syrian students (18-35 years old), each lasts for 3 weeks maximum in one of the following topics: Reconstruction Planning and Local Economic Development, Applied Research for Transition, Utility Management in Conflict-affected Societies, Foundations of Entrepreneurship in Conflict-affected Societies, or Youth Communication in Conflict-affected Societies. The courses are prepared and co-taught by international and Syrian professors, local and in exile. (Interview TINT05, 2014).

To ensure sustainability, NGOs are trying to be self-sufficient to avoid the possible cuts of donor contributions in the long run. The Ajyal Centre for Psychological and Educational Support is one of them. It covers all education-related costs; supplies, transportation and stationary. One of the teachers reported:

*The centre is not attached to any entity or organisation, it gets private support from the management; the principal and her husband. As for the educational staff, we have received money for the first two months of work only, but since two months now, we did not receive our salaries* (Interview TINT07, 2014).

Since the Syrian teachers in Syrian schools in southern Turkey have limited teaching experience, they are keen to improve their teaching skills. In response to this, a group of Syrian teachers took on the responsibility to train volunteer Syrian teachers. A teacher explained the importance of this initiative: ‘We are grateful that trainings are taking place here in Antakya regularly. In case we hear about any training, we send our teacher immediately. They are a group of Syrian teachers with older experiences who provide such trainings’ (Interview TINT07, 2014).

These small-scale initiatives could be scaled up to bring further improvements, but advocacy and macro level policy change is needed to establish long-term coherent, coordinated strategies for refugee education.

## Conclusions and recommendations

### Jordan

Jordan’s public schooling systems are largely overwhelmed, unable to absorb the numbers of refugee school-aged children and youth. Free access to public schools and expansion of spaces through double-shift systems have not been able to supply formal education services in line with demand. Delays in registration with UNHCR and the Jordanian authorities prolong the time young people remain out of school. Once registered, the lack of space in overcrowded schools, ineligibility due to having been out of school for too long and/or dislike of lower grade placement denies many from accessing formal education. Economic deprivation prevents some young refugees from re-engaging with education. The expenses related to education such as transportation and supplies is another impediment but many also feel
compelled to work to provide financially for their families and work in the informal sector makes them susceptible to exploitation. Studies within Jordan’s camps show signs of despondency, social withdrawal and a sense of hopelessness among refugee youth who are in limbo, many unable to study or work.

The international humanitarian response to the Syrian crisis is at a crossroads. Several recent trends may shift funds and resources devoted to the refugee education response and, subsequently, affect the capacity of services provided. First, the number of refugee entrants into Jordan has declined drastically, from over 1,000 per day in mid-2013 to fewer than 100 per day during summer 2014. Accordingly, the demographic projections of the UNHCR refugee response plans have proven inflated: in mid-2013 for instance, it was expected that by late 2013 the number of refugees would reach one million, while the actual number was about 575,000. The current response plan (RRP6) predicted 800,000 refugees by December 2014, it is doubtful that such a figure will be reached.

Accordingly, while most donor countries agree that the challenges related to the management of the Syrian refugees are huge in Jordan, they also point out that the situation is about to stabilise, paving the way for a shift in priorities and funds towards more challenging countries and issues such as instability in Lebanon and war-stricken Syria itself. Donor monies in Jordan may henceforth be increasingly ascribed to longer-term programmes likely to reinforce the transition from relief to development. However, because education represents a continuum between these two extremes of international assistance, it may be spared massive funding cuts. Furthermore, efforts by UNICEF’s ‘no lost generation’ campaign and the fact that Jordan’s National Resilience plan has channelled its most important investment budgets into education and WASH is indicative of the prominent position enjoyed by education within the Jordanian agenda (MOPIC, 2014).

It is important that education is not examined outside the wider political and socioeconomic contexts. What will chiefly define the future of refugee youth education in Jordan is the decisions the government makes regarding the mid to longer term status of the Syrian refugees. In the socioeconomic field, such decisions pertain first to access to the local employment market. Ultimately, is education meant to turn Syrian refugees into unskilled labourers operating in the informal labour market? To what extent could refugees be of benefit to Jordan’s economy without affecting the interests of the host population? If a non-assimilation approach is pursued, what are the alternatives: contain refugee economic activity in the refugee camps and promote a strategy of ‘exportation’ of the Syrian refugees towards the labour-demanding economies of the Arab world and beyond?

Lebanon

With the largest refugee population from Syria – 1,142,000 at the time of writing – Lebanon’s national education system and relief efforts are under immense pressure. A large proportion of refugees remain unregistered, which prevents access to education and other social services. Poverty drives refugee families, particularly in Lebanon’s Bekaa region to send children and youth to work. With many young refugees in employment, the opportunity to re-enter

41 Initiated by independent economists, a debate has been going on since the summer of 2013 around the impact of the Syrians on the job market and the economy at large. Whereas the government has insisted on its negative aspects (wage dumping, higher unemployment rates in the most affected northern governorates, higher housing rents, etc. several economists have highlighted their positive impacts especially in regions where previous economic activity was stagnant.
education is limited. At the service provision level, refugee youth are deprived of education owing to school-related expenses and items such as tuition, stationery, books and transportation. Interventions that can help parents to overcome financial barriers to education remain necessary.

Significant efforts have been taken to open closed schools, instigate building new schools and enrol more Syrian students through the double shift systems, yet only 19% access formal secondary school (ILO, 2013). However, within Lebanon’s public schools, services and facilities vary in quality. Past mapping reports and field research indicate basic facilities are lacking in schools such as running water and stable electricity supplies. Moreover, FGDs illustrated the need for the development and enforcement of child protection policies in schools, and raised awareness of child abuse and protection issues among teachers and principals.

The private sector possesses a great potential in Lebanon given its flexibility and ability to tailor itself to children’s needs. Designing and funding a second shift system in Lebanese private schools and covering all related expenses to enrol thousands of refugee children and adolescents, represents a feasible and efficient solution. Partnering with Lebanese formal vocational training institutions to design programmes that are tailored to the needs and living conditions of young refugees, and then enrolling them for a minimal fee that can be covered by funders and donors, is a highly recommended solution. Other potential solutions include partnering with Lebanese vocational and higher education institutions to provide partial and full scholarships for exceptional and talented young refugees; and partnering with NGOs that provide NFE to include non-formal and - where possible - formal vocational training at their centres.

**Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)**

Secondary education in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) faces numerous challenges. At the core of the lack of education for refugee youth in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) is the lack of funding and the lack of secondary schools in both camps and non-camp settings. Teachers’ salaries cannot be paid, or they experience long delays, and classrooms lack basic facilities. This situation conspires to jeopardise access and threatens the quality of teaching and learning (Interview KINT07, 2014). Access to post-primary education is largely unavailable in the area. Young refugees expressed hopelessness and lacked the motivation to engage in education and training given the diminished prospects for further study or meaningful employment.

Another serious issue challenging the quality of refugee youth education in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) is the question of the curricula and language of instruction. Refugee youth need more Arabic schools, which currently only make up 1% of schools provided. Syrian Kurdish youth struggle to learn in Kurdish, a language used in the home but not previously in the classroom. From FGD discussions, the lack of availability of teaching in Arabic emerged as a major factor preventing access and meaningful learning in the classroom.

With regard to the choice of curriculum, systems need to be in place to certify and accredit their achievements; otherwise, young graduates are left devoid of any educational certification. This has the knock-on effect of deterring young people from attending schools and training when it is offered (Interview KINT12, 2014). Overall, in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) there are a number of international organisations working in the field of
education but systems need to be considerably strengthened and expanded to ensure young people can access education and training to fulfil their potential.

At the time of writing, in August 2014, schools in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) are currently used as makeshift shelters for IDPs fleeing violence and persecution in Northern areas of Iraq. 700 schools in Duhok, 51 schools in Sulaymaniyah, 20 in Erbil, 11 in the Christian quarter in Erbil, and nine in three different districts (Soran, Khabat, Koysinjaq) are inhabited by IDPs. This does not bode well for the academic opportunities for refugee and IDP young people in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) in the forthcoming academic year (Personal communication, Dr Yousif Suorchi, general director at the MOE in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), 20th August 2014).

Effectively, the physical infrastructure of youth education, already vastly under-resourced in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), is under yet more strain. Increased funding and resources are needed for education initiatives, together with efforts to find alternative housing for IDPs; this is of paramount importance if educational inclusion is to be granted to refugee and recently arrived IDP students.

**Turkey**

Access to education for camp-based youth in Turkey is markedly higher than for their urban and rural counterparts. This disparity points to the need for a more coordinated education strategy for self-settled refugee students in rural and urban areas. Owing to language barriers, the majority of refugee students outside of Turkey’s camps, accustomed to learning in Arabic, cannot access public schools in Turkey. As a result, many opt to attend community-based education initiatives run by Syrian teachers. There is little regulation and no reported monitoring by education authorities of community-run schools. Without such evaluations quality of learning is not assured. Curriculum choice, and with it accreditation, is another factor that has an impact on the quality of refugee education in Turkey. Field research found that students alternate between studying the Turkish, Syrian, Syrian Opposition (NCS) and Libyan curricula, based mainly on whether their studies can be certified. Regulation, standardisation and enhanced coordination is needed to improve education and accreditation systems for refugee students in Turkey. Care should also be taken to deliver teaching that is responsive to students’ needs rather than shaped according to donor requirements.

Syrian children and youth lack adequate Turkish language training which not only stops many from accessing the public education system but also hampers the integration process. More interventions are needed that can bring together Syrian and Turkish host communities to promote social capital and counteract rising tensions between refugee and host communities. Specific interventions to target the most neglected groups including children with disabilities, former child soldiers and traumatised children who suffer from severe psychosocial issues are also in high demand throughout refugee communities in Turkey. While grassroots initiatives at local government and civil society level work to address gaps in terms of covering education-related costs, language courses, formal and non-formal education, Turkey needs increased resources to meet refugees’ demands for education.

Research and literature consistently shows that many young people in Turkey are working rather than studying, particularly young men and women outside Turkey’s camps. While some young people opt to work due to financial demands, others are excluded from education because they do not have valid residency permits. Families without official legal status cannot register their children at public schools, yet information on accessing residency permits is not
clearly communicated to refugee communities in Turkey. This in turn creates confusion and can lead to young people being excluded from access to schooling.

As the educational demand from young refugees grows, it will perhaps require the government to open Turkey’s camps to NGOs to assist in service provision. A recent move to open access to Turkey’s camps for certain NGOs could herald an increase in the education provision for youth in Turkey’s refugee camps.

**General recommendations**

- Design well-structured, free training programmes for working youth to retain young people in education and enhance their professional performance and find better paid jobs;
- Advocate for and support education programmes that are tailored to include refugee youth in work;
- Identify adolescents who are at risk of dropout, or who have dropped out recently, and provide them with suitable counselling, academic support and alternative options for education;
- Establish TVET and livelihood centres that provide extensive training on skilled jobs that could be tied to the job market and appropriate legal frameworks, and be of use upon return to Syria;
- Establish apprenticeship schemes for youth from Syria in collaboration with the private sector and respective government bodies;
- Open more teacher training programmes for Syrian and host community teachers;
- Conduct more thorough, in-depth research targeted at the 12-25 refugee age group to analyse and understand their living conditions, challenges and needs, and to design educational support plans accordingly;
- Provide funding for tuition fees, transportation, books, stationery and teaching materials for refugee students in urban communities to help overcome financial barriers;
- Promote and fund the development of structured and accredited NFE programmes that can accommodate large numbers of refugee children and youth especially in rural areas;
- Support governments in the region to build more schools, increase teaching resources and expand capacity;
- Expand virtual self-learning tools such as online courses or educational TV programmes.

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42 Adolescents most at risk are those older than their grade level, those already working or coming from a highly disadvantaged family, those living at a far distance from school, and those in their last year of the primary cycle, specifically girls.
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(* = member of the Education Sector Working Group)

Lebanon
Interview LINT01, Education Researcher, Nizar Ghanem, Education Researcher, via Skype, 17 June 2014.

Interview LINT02, Headmaster and Director, Seham Shehabi and Fadi Halliso, Basmeh and Zeitooneh, Beirut, 26 June 2014.

Interview LINT03, Education Coordinator, Iman Al-Khatib, War Child Holland, Beirut, 27 June 2014.

Interview LINT04, Director, Ranim Ibrahim, Alphabet, Beirut, 3 July 2014.

Interview LINT05, NGO respondent, Sawa for Syria, Beirut, 8 July 2014.

Interview LINT06, Regional Bureau for Education in the Arab States, Gabriel El-Khili, UNESCO, Beirut, 11 August 2014.

Interview LINT07, Chief Field Education Office, Walid Khatib, UNRWA, Beirut, 4 July 2014.


Interview LINT09, Education Coordinator – Akkar, Richard Last, Relief and Reconciliation, via E-mail correspondence, 20 July 2014.

Interview LINT10, Professor at University of Balamand, Dr. Bashayer Madi, University of Balamand, Balamand, 17 July 2014.

Interview LINT11, Education Coordinator, Mirella Chekrallah, Caritas, Beirut, 23 July 2014.
Interview LINT12, Relief Unit Coordinator, Mohamad Mansour, Makhzoumi Foundation, Beirut, 26 July 2014.

Interview LINT13, Professor in Education and Migration, Dr. Maha Shuayb, Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, Beirut, 25 June 2014.

**Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)**

Interview KINT01, Education Project Officer, Rebaz Haji Hassan and Project Directors Rezan Khattab, Rwanga, Charity Organisation, Erbil, 2 June 2014

Interview KINT02, Project Manager, Akar Kamal Mustafa, Reach Organisation, Erbil, 16 June 2014

Interview KINT03, Refugee Department Manager, Rawaj Haji, Barzani Charity Foundation, Erbil, 23 June 2014

Interview KINT04, Deputy General Director, Faisl Hassan and Head of Planning Department, Paxshan Sabir Aziz DOE, Erbil, 24 June 2014

Interview KINT05, Education Emergency Specialist, Sara Eliasi, UNICEF No Lost Generation, Erbil, 10 June 2014

Interview KINT06, Emergency Education Specialist, April Coetzee, UNICEF, Erbil, 29 June 2014

Interview KINT07, Emergency Education Officer, Emily Durkin, Save the Children International NGO, Erbil, 1 July 2014.

Interview KINT08, Project Manager Jamal Salih and Community Centre Coordinator, Bahra Abdulrahman, Reach, Sulaymaniyah, 8 July 2014

Interview KINT09, Education Coordinator, Andrew Mathew, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Erbil, 11 July 2008.

Interview KINT11, Head of Mission, Sanad Anis Ibrahim, Triangle, Erbil, 18 July 2014

Interview KINT04, Director of Follow Up and the focal Point for Education Emergency, Parzheen Abdulrahman Ali, Ministry of Education, Erbil, 21 July 2014

Interview KINT13, Manager, Daratu Learning Centre, Shilan Muhammad, and Director Fakhradeen Hamza, Jord/Judy Organisation for Relief and Development, Erbil 22 July 2014

Interview KINT14, Education focal point, Ibrahim Hussein Issa, UNHCR, Domiz Camp, Duhok, 27 July 2014

Interview KINT16, Youth Program Analyst, Hossein Hanary, UNFPA, 29 June 2014

Interview KINT17, Syrian Kurdish Refugee Council in Sulaymaniyah, Khalid Abdullah, 9 July 2014.
Turkey
Interview TINT01, Program Manager, Jihane Nami, Mercy Corps, Gaziantep, 4 July 2014
Interview TINT02, Teacher in the Syrian school in Konya, Gaziantep, 7 July 2014
Interview TINT04, Teacher in AlFatih School in Antakya, Antakya, 12 July 2014
Interview TINT05, Teacher in AlShria School in Antakya, Antakya, 13 July 2014
Interview TINT06, Teacher, Bunat Al-Mustakbal School, Antakya, 13 July 2014
Interview TINT07, Teacher, Ajyal Centre for Psychological and Educational Support, Antakya, 13 July 2014
Interview TINT09, Program Manager, Martina Sedlakova, Spark, via Skype, 16 July 2014
Interview TINT10, Educational Adviser to Prime Minister, Syrian Interim Ministry of Education, Gaziantep, 18 July 2014
Interview TINT11, Community Centre Manager in Kirikhan, Korol Dike, Yuva Association, via Skype, 25 July 2014
Interview TINT12, Representative of the European External Action Service in Gaziantep on the Syrian Crisis, Gaziantep, 25 July 2014
Interview TINT13, Senior Research and Program Officer, James King, Institute of International Education, via Skype, 25 July 2014
Interview TINT14, Senior Fellow, Xanthe Ackerman, Syrian Research and Evaluation Organisation, via Skype, 29 July 2014
Interview TINT16, Political Adviser, the French Embassy in Ankara, Gaziantep, 5 August 2014
Interview TINT17, Education expert, Selman İşik, Ministry of National Education, Ankara, 8 July 2014
Interview TINT18 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Anıl Çiçek, Ankara, 30 June 2014

8 Focus Group Discussions

Jordan
FGD JFG01, Zarqa Lebanon, 11 June 2014
FGD JFG02, Amman, Jordan, 17 July 2014
FGD JFG03, Ramtha, Jordan, 11 August 2014

Lebanon
FGD LFG01, Beirut and Mount Lebanon, Lebanon, 14 June 2014
FGD LFG02, Saida, Lebanon, 30 July 2014
FGD LFG03, Beqaa, Lebanon, 3 July 2014
Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)
FGD KFG01, Domiz, Duhok, 27 July 2014
FGD KFG02, Kasnazan, Erbil, 9 June 2014
FGD KFG03, Sulaymaniyah, 9 July 2014
FGD KFG04, Qushtapa, 18 June 2014

Turkey
FGD TFG01, Gaziantep, 6 July 2014
FGD TFG02, Antakya, 12 July 2014
FGD TFG03, Gaziantep, 18 July 2014

9 Annex 1: Refugee Youth Education Providers by Country

Jordan
- Aliim
- British Council
- Caritas
- Edukans Foundation
- Finn Church Aid
- Generation for Peace
- International Relief and Development
- IOCC
- Islamic Centre
- Islamic Relief Worldwide
- Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS)
- Kittab wa Sunna
- Madrassati
- Mercy Corps
- Norwegian Refugee Council
- Save the Children Jordan
- Save the Children International
- UNESCO and Queen Rania Teacher Academy
- UNESCO and Questscope
- UNICEF
- UNRWA
- World Vision

Lebanon
- ACF
- ACTED
- ADRA
- Alphabet
- Amel
- American Near East Refugee Aid (ANERA)
- AMURT
• ARCS
• Armadilla
• AVSI
• Balamand University
• BBC Media Action
• CARE International
• Caritas Lebanon Migrant Center
• CCP Japan
• CCPA Lebanon
• CHF
• Concern Worldwide
• CRI
• DAHLIA
• Danish People’s Aid
• Deakin University
• DFID
• DRASATI-II
• DRC
• ECHO
• FAO
• ForumZFD
• FPSC
• GVC
• Handicap International
• Help Age
• Hilswerk Austria International
• Human Rights Watch
• HWA
• ICRC
• Ideals
• Idraac
• IECD
• IMMAP
• International Medical Corps
• International Rescue Committee
• Internews
• INTERSOS
• IOCC
• IQRA
• IQRA Association
• Iraqi Refugee Assistance Project
• Islamic Relief
• Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS)
• Jusoor
• Lebanese Society for Educational and Social Development (LSESD)
• Lebanon Humanitarian INGO Forum (LHIF)
• Makassed
• Makhzoumi
• Medical Aid for Palestinians (MAP)
• Mennonite Central Committee
• Mercy
• Mercy Corps
• Ministry of Higher Education (MEHE)
• Ministry of Social Affairs
• Mouvement Sociale
• Norwegian People’s Aid
• Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)
• OCHA
• OTI
• Oxfam
• PARD
• PRM
• Reach
• Red Cross
• Relief International
• RESCATE
• RET
• Save the Children
• SAWA
• Search for Common Ground (SFCG)
• Seraphim Global
• Sonbola
• Terre des Hommes
• UNDP
• UNESCO
• UNESCO
• UNFPA
• UNHCR
• UNICEF
• Union of Relief and Development Associations in Lebanon
• UNOCHA
• UNRWA
• UNRWA
• UNSCOL
• URDA
• War Child
• World Food Program

**Northern Iraq / Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)**
• Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED)
• Barzani Charity Foundation
• CDO Civil Development Organisation
• Dar Beru
• DOE
• HARIKAR
• INTERSOS
• IOM
• International Rescue Committee
• Judy Organisation for Relief and Development
• Kurdistan Regional Government
• Mercy Corps
• Norwegian Refugee Council
• PAO
• Peace Winds Japan
• Reach
• Rise Foundation
• Rwanga
• Save the Children Kurdistan
• STEP
• Terre des Hommes Italy
• Triangle
• UNESCO
• UNFPA
• UNHCR
• UNICEF
• World Food Programme

**Turkey**
• Caritas Turkey
• Danish Refugee Council
• International Blue Crescent
• International Medical Corps
• IOM
• International Rescue Committee
• Karam foundation
• Kimse Yok Mu
• Mercy Corps
• Norwegian Refugee Council
• PAAH (Polish humanitarian assistance)
• Save the Children
• Syrian Business Forum
• SPARK
• Support to Life
• Telecoms Sans Frontier (TSF)
• UNHCR
• UNICEF
• Yuva
• Zakat Foundation
### Annex 2: Non-formal education types: Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Educational Condition</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP)</td>
<td>9-18</td>
<td>Any dropout for at least 2 years up to Cycle 3</td>
<td>Similar to formal schooling, ALP is administered in 5 sessions per day, 5 days a week. It is designed to help children and youth achieve basic academic qualifications and acquire essential skills of the official curriculum in a condensed period of time, in preparation to be reintegrated into formal education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remedial Classes</td>
<td>6-18</td>
<td>Child enrolled in formal education and at risk of dropping out</td>
<td>Remedial classes are administered along a period of 3 months, 2-3 days a week, 3-4 hours a day. It aims at supporting students enrolled in formal education, and at risk of falling behind or dropping out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catch-up Programme</td>
<td>7-18</td>
<td>Any dropout for less than 2 years, starting from Grade 2</td>
<td>Targets out-of-school children who missed more than 2 school years, to prepare them for reintegration into formal schooling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-Based Education (CBE)</td>
<td>6-13</td>
<td>Child unable to enrol in formal education (Grades 1-6); including dropouts for less than 2 years</td>
<td>CBE follows the school calendar years, and teaches the formal curriculum in community-based non-formal setting. It provides access to education for children in areas where no places or schools or are available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Literacy and Numeracy (BLN)</td>
<td>6-18</td>
<td>Child unable to read and write</td>
<td>BLN is administered in a minimum of 160 hours, and aims at teaching basic literacy and mathematical skills.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>